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Summary 
 
The systemic role of foreign banks in the CESEE region coupled with the turbulence 
in financial markets back in 2008, have given rise to the study at hand. Some years 
after the global crisis, it is a perfect moment to conduct an overarching analysis of the 
parent-subsidiary relationship and to examine how those banks behave at micro level.  
 
Firstly, the study discerns between different types of foreign ownership and explores 
their propensity to extend credit vis-à-vis their domestic owned competitors. Secondly 
it focuses on banks, which are members of foreign financial groups and which 
constitute the vast majority of foreign owned banks with operations in the CESEE 
region. It investigates whether the parent level can explain any of the variation of 
subsidiaries' capability to extend credit. Thirdly it looks into the particular parent 
bank characteristics with an influence on subsidiaries credit growth. Fourthly it 
researches whether the ownership effect changes after the crisis. Finally, it 
investigates the effect of the business cycle on subsidiaries' credit extensions and how 
the business cycle of the home country of the parent bank matters. 
 
A prerequisite for this investigation is the understanding of the actual ownership 
structure and changes. Banking sectors in the region are rather dynamic and 
characterized by entries, exits and changes of ownership, while major corporate 
restructuring has taken place at the parent level too. Therefore the present study is 
grounded in a unique and new database, which complements the empirical literature 
in several ways. It has both a wide geographical and sectorial coverage, while it has 
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adopted a more thorough definition of foreign ownership that captures the cross 
border relationships at full extent. It identifies the ultimate owner of each subsidiary 
bank, instead of focusing only on the direct ownership. The final sample spans over 
the period 2000-2014 and includes 323 banks (domestic and subsidiary banks) 
operating in 18 countries of Central Eastern and Central Eastern Europe (CEESE) and 
84 ultimate owner banks (parents). 
 
The empirical exploration is divided into three logical steps. First, the study provides 
insights on the impact of foreign ownership on host countries’ credit growth. Credit 
growth is modeled in a dynamic framework employing GMM estimation 
methodologies and accounting for ownership, individual bank characteristics as well 
as macroeconomic effects. Second, it is investigated the homogeneity of loan growth 
across subsidiaries belonging to the same international financial group (parent), 
operating in different markets. In this step a Crossed Random Effects Model is 
employed. By doing so, it is proved that there is an omitted common effect across the 
subsidiaries. Therefore the empirical models employed above, can produce consistent 
estimates of the credit growth of subsidiaries only if controls are added for those 
factors. Which leads to the third step. In the dynamic credit growth model are added 
further parent bank variables/controls as well as parent related such as the country of 
origin of the parent and the macroeconomic conditions in the home country.  
 
Estimation results indicate that all types of foreign participation in the ownership 
structure are crucial to the performance of the subsidiary. However, members of 
foreign financial groups are bearing the largest influence and most significant one. 
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Given that they constitute the largest category of foreign owners, it is crucial to 
investigate further their behavior. Subsidiaries' credit behavior cannot be viewed in 
isolation. To the contrary, it needs to be framed into the operating landscape, which 
includes the linkages to foreign entities and their economies. 
 
Subsidiaries' profitability has been found significant only rarely. Therefore, 
subsidiaries do not fund their growth through their own profits. This indicates a 
longer-term expansion strategy of parents in the region, whereby current profitability 
at the domestic level is a secondary parameter. Parents' asset quality (loan impairment 
charges) is a relevant determinant of credit growth at subsidiary level. Loan 
impairment charges are also at subsidiary level significant. Loan impairments are the 
result of the project screening intelligence at consolidated level. The global financial 
crisis determined losses for banks and a deterioration of their loan portfolio. The 
measure of loan impairments and their effect on credit growth capture intrinsic 
characteristics of parents such as their ability to manage their portfolios and choose to 
finance profitable projects. Finally, a peer group analysis unveils that risky behaviors 
at the parent bank level jeopardize future credit extensions at the subsidiary level. 
Specifically, excessive credit expansion and reduction of economic capital ratios lead 
to a decline in subsidiaries' lending capacity in three years’ time. 
 
Overall, the presence of foreign banks in the CESEE region is judged as beneficial. 
Parent banks originated from flourishing economies benefit the host countries, 
through further extensions of credit by their subsidiaries.  Indeed, they have 
contributed to a contraction of credit after the global financial crisis. Yet, their 
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reaction was less pronounced compared with the contraction exercised by domestic 
banks. 
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Resumen 
 
El papel sistémico de los bancos extranjeros en la región de Centro-Europa y Europa 
Oriental (CESEE), junto con la turbulencia de los mercados financieros en 2008, han 
dado lugar al estudio actual. Algunos años después de la crisis global, es un momento 
perfecto para llevar a cabo un análisis global de la relación banco matriz–filial y para 
examinar cómo se comportan esos bancos a nivel microeconómico. 
 
En primer lugar, el estudio discierne entre los diferentes tipos de propiedad extranjera 
y explora su propensión a extender el crédito frente a sus competidores nacionales. En 
segundo lugar, se centra en los bancos, que son miembros de grupos financieros 
extranjeros y que constituyen la gran mayoría de los bancos de propiedad extranjera 
con operaciones en la región CESEE. Investigamos si el papel de los bancos 
principales puede explicar alguna parte de la variación de la capacidad de sus filiales 
para extender el crédito. En tercer lugar, se examinan las características particulares 
de los bancos principales, lo que influye en el crecimiento del crédito de las filiales. 
En cuarto lugar, investigamos si el efecto de propiedad cambia después de la crisis. 
Por último, se investiga el efecto del ciclo económico sobre las ampliaciones de 
crédito de las filiales y cómo afecta el ciclo económico del país de origen del banco 
matriz. 
 
Un requisito previo para esta investigación es la comprensión de la estructura de 
propiedad real y los cambios. Los sectores bancarios de la región son bastante 
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dinámicos y se caracterizan por las entradas, las salidas y los cambios de propiedad, 
mientras que la reestructuración de las grandes empresas también ha tenido lugar en la 
matriz. Por lo tanto, el presente estudio se basa en una base de datos única y nueva, 
que complementa la literatura empírica de varias maneras. Permite una amplia 
cobertura geográfica y sectorial, mientras adopta una definición más completa de la 
propiedad extranjera que capta las relaciones transfronterizas en toda su extensión. 
Identificamos al propietario final de cada banco subsidiario, en lugar de centrarnos 
sólo en la propiedad directa. La muestra final abarca el período 2000-2014 e incluye 
323 bancos (bancos nacionales y filiales) que operan en 18 países de Europa central y 
oriental y 84 bancos propietarios (matriz). 
 
La exploración empírica se divide en tres pasos lógicos. En primer lugar, el estudio 
proporciona información sobre el impacto de la propiedad extranjera sobre el 
crecimiento crediticio de los países anfitriones. El crecimiento del crédito se modela 
en un marco dinámico que emplea metodologías de estimación de GMM y que 
explica la propiedad, las características individuales de los bancos y los efectos 
macroeconómicos. En segundo lugar, se investiga la homogeneidad del crecimiento 
de los préstamos entre las filiales pertenecientes al mismo grupo financiero 
internacional (matriz), que operan en diferentes mercados. En este paso se emplea un 
modelo de efectos aleatorios cruzados. Al hacerlo, se demuestra que existe un efecto 
común omitido entre las filiales. Por lo tanto, los modelos empíricos empleados 
anteriormente, pueden producir estimaciones consistentes del crecimiento del crédito 
de las subsidiarias sólo si se agregan controles para esos factores. Lo que lleva al 
tercer paso. En el modelo dinámico de crecimiento del crédito se añaden otras 
variables de control del banco matriz, así como relacionados con los padres, tales 
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como el país de origen del padre y las condiciones macroeconómicas en el país de 
origen. 
 
Los resultados de la estimación indican que todos los tipos de participación extranjera 
en la estructura de propiedad son cruciales para el desempeño de la subsidiaria. Sin 
embargo, los miembros de los grupos financieros extranjeros tienen la mayor 
influencia y la más significativa. 
 
Dado que constituyen la categoría más grande de propietarios extranjeros, es crucial 
investigar más a fondo su comportamiento. El comportamiento crediticio de las 
filiales no puede considerarse aisladamente. Por el contrario, necesita ser enmarcada 
en el panorama operativo, que incluye los vínculos con entidades extranjeras y sus 
economías. 
 
La rentabilidad de las filiales se ha encontrado significativa solamente en algunos 
casos. Por lo tanto, las filiales no financian su crecimiento con sus propios beneficios. 
Esto indica una estrategia de expansión a largo plazo de los padres en la región, por lo 
que la rentabilidad actual a nivel doméstico es un parámetro secundario. La calidad de 
los activos de los padres (cargos por deterioro del crédito) es un determinante 
relevante del crecimiento del crédito a nivel subsidiario. Las cargas por deterioro de 
préstamos también son significativas a nivel subsidiario. Los impedimentos del 
préstamo son el resultado de la inteligencia de tamizaje del proyecto a nivel 
consolidado. La crisis financiera mundial determinó pérdidas para los bancos y un 
deterioro de su cartera de préstamos. La medida de los deterioros de préstamos y su 
efecto sobre el crecimiento del crédito capturan las características intrínsecas de los 
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padres, como su capacidad para administrar sus carteras y optan por financiar 
proyectos rentables. Por último, un análisis de grupos de pares revela que los 
comportamientos arriesgados en el nivel del banco padre ponen en peligro futuras 
extensiones de crédito a nivel subsidiario. En concreto, la expansión excesiva del 
crédito y la reducción de los coeficientes de capital económico llevan a una 
disminución de la capacidad crediticia de las filiales dentro de tres años. 
 
En general, la presencia de bancos extranjeros en la región CESEE se confirma como 
un factor beneficioso. Los bancos-matriz se originan a partir de economías en auge y 
benefician a los países de acogida, a través de grandes extensiones de crédito por 
parte de sus filiales. De hecho, han contribuido a una contracción del crédito tras la 
crisis financiera global. Sin embargo, su reacción fue menos pronunciada en 
comparación con la contracción ejercida por los bancos nacionales. 
 
 Chapter 1   
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign owned banks fostered convergence and economic growth in Central Southern 
Eastern Europe (CESEE). They contributed to raise the living standards and 
supported increasing investment levels. During the period 1998-2005, foreign banks 
issued 85% of new credit in New Member States
1
 (Sirtaine and Skamnelos, 2007). 
Today the share of foreign ownership in the banking sector is exceptionally high, 
making most subsidiary banks systemically important at local level. Moreover, the 
existence of internal capital markets within international banking groups is a 
fundamental vehicle to spur growth throughout the network as well as to possibly 
transmit financial weaknesses. Recently the global financial crisis imposed severe 
capital and liquidity constraints to the parents of branches/subsidiaries operating in 
the CESEE region. This has possibly contributed to the transmission of shocks from 
home to host countries, thus threatening financial stability and requiring safeguards. 
For example, the Vienna Initiative, a public-private coordination mechanism, was 
                                                          
1 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania 
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established to avoid disruptive behaviors in five economies of emerging Europe at the 
early stages of the financial crisis. Several years after the breakout of the global crisis 
it is a perfect moment to form a thorough understanding of the parent/subsidiary 
relationship and its functioning in a multi-years perspective starting from early 2000.  
 
Several studies have investigated the role of foreign owned banks on host economies 
performance and banking sector financial stability. To do so, numerous approaches 
and methodologies have been employed. A stream of research connects firm level 
data with bank characteristics and controls for ownership effects during a very short 
time period. Another strand of literature uses either highly aggregated data or bank 
level data (Sirtaine and Skamnelos, 2007) to examine the lending behavior of banks. 
For example, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) investigated the transmission of the 
global financial crisis across borders. Their analysis is based on highly aggregated 
data, sourced from the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Consolidated 
International Banking Statistics.  
 
A third approach employs bank level data and examines the effect of ownership on 
subsidiaries’ lending behavior over an extended period of time. Cull and Martinez 
Peria (2013) examined the impact of bank ownership on credit growth in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe immediately before and during the 2008/2009 crisis. 
Dinger (2009) builds on a database structured along a relatively extended time period 
(1994-2004), while focusing on ten CEE countries. On aggregate the study shows that 
a high degree of foreign bank penetration – via subsidiaries – smooths aggregate 
liquidity problems.  De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) sample the CEE region for the 
period 1993-2000. It finds that foreign banks provide more stable lending than 
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domestic banks. Foreign owned banks are more sensitive to host country's growth 
than domestic banks. The authors attribute this evidence to the emergence of internal 
capital markets within financial conglomerates. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) 
develops the previous analysis employing a worldwide sample of 45 multinational for 
the period 1991-2004. De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) includes also the period of 
the global financial crisis. This paper employs bank level data covering a sample of 
large 48 multinational banks with global operations for the period 1992-2009. It finds 
that multinational bank subsidiaries during the credit crunch cut down credit more 
than the counterfactual they constructed - i.e. a sample of domestic banks. Allen et al. 
(2015) studies the effect of ownership in 11 CEE countries over the period 1994-
2010, comparing foreign owned banks (subsidiaries) to domestic owned banks. Jeon 
et al. (2013) finds that subsidiaries' lending behavior is strongly influenced by their 
parents' financial condition. This was found particularly strong in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The paper employs a worldwide sample of 68 large multinational banks with 
subsidiaries in emerging economies for the period 1994-2008. 
 
Current research is enshrined in the third stream of literature. Given foreign banks 
systemic importance in the CESEE region, it is necessary to revisit their role for local 
financial stability and to examine how those banks behave at micro level. Therefore, it 
is tested the propensity to extend credit of foreign owned banks (i.e. subsidiaries) vis-
à-vis their domestic owned competitors. Moreover, there are investigated the key 
subsidiaries’ and parents’ characteristics influencing credit extensions. A focal point 
of the analysis is the health of banks (both parent and subsidiary health). For example, 
thinly capitalized banks tend to respond to moral hazard incentives and undertake 
increased portfolio risk, thus showing high NPL ratios the following years (Berger 
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and De Young, 1997). As a result high NPLs may constraint the ability of banks to 
lend even more so when combined with a weak economic capital and asset position.  
 
The current study addresses a set of key interrelated questions. Did subsidiaries 
extend credit more than domestic banks? And was this effect the same before and 
after the crisis? Have parents’ characteristics had an influence on subsidiaries’ 
capability to extend credit? Have health and risk-taking attitude of parent banks 
impacted on subsidiaries credit growth? Finally, what is the effect of the business 
cycle on subsidiaries' credit extensions and how the business cycle of the home 
country of the parent bank matters? 
 
A prerequisite for this investigation is the understanding of the actual ownership 
structure and changes. Many subsidiaries operating across different countries in the 
region share the same parent. Moreover, banking sectors in the region are rather 
dynamic and characterized by entries, exits and changes of ownership. After the first 
privatization wave, foreign banks kept entering the market, thus creating new banks 
(greenfields). Another phase in the development of the CESEE banking sector has 
seen takeovers at subsidiary level and major corporate restructuring at the parent 
level. 
 
A necessary condition to conduct the analysis is the construction of a suitable 
database. Indeed, a unique and new database was constructed which complements and 
enhances the empirical literature in different ways. First, it combines a very wide 
geographical coverage of the region (i.e. 18 CEESE countries over 14 years). Second, 
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it has adopted a more thorough definition of foreign ownership. It identifies the 
ultimate owner of each subsidiary bank, instead of focusing only on the direct 
ownership as done in previous studies. This definition of ownership helps capturing 
the cross border relationships at full extent over time. Third, it is of wider sectorial 
coverage, since the ownership of all banks operating in the CESEE region has been 
looked into; whilst earlier studies examine the behavior of some major multinational 
banks operating in the same perimeter.  
 
The analysis examines credit growth in a dynamic setting and uses controls for 
ownership. It distinguishes between domestic banks and several types of foreign 
ownership. The first result indicates that subsidiaries owned by foreign financial 
groups provide an extra boost to credit growth at the domestic level. Before 
scrutinizing the nexus between parent bank characteristics and subsidiaries’ credit 
extensions, the study pins down empirically why we must control for parent level 
features. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to do so in this stream of literature. 
A static crossed random effects model is employed in order to measure the similarity 
between subsidiaries belonging to the same group. Subsidiaries that share the same 
parent and operate during the same year exhibit exceptionally similar patterns, when it 
comes to credit extensions. The finding of this stage of analysis is that banks 
operating across different countries in the region are very much similar in the way 
they extend credit if they belong to the same parent bank.  
 
These results guide the study to the next stage. A dynamic credit growth model is 
estimated across the sub-sample of subsidiaries owned by foreign financial groups, 
controlling systematically for subsidiary and parent banks’ characteristics as well as 
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home and host macro factors. Parent bank health in terms of asset quality is one of the 
most important and consistent predictors of subsidiaries credit growth. Also past 
profitability at consolidated level is an important determinant of subsidiary's credit 
growth. Therefore, banks manage their profit and losses at consolidated level; and 
consequently it is at consolidated level that one expects to detect a risky behavior 
when extending credit at subsidiary level.  
 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
describes our database, its construction and some statistical properties of the 
employed variables. Section 4 presents the employed empirical approach and the 
estimation methodologies.  Section 5 reports and discusses the results.  By doing so, it 
explores further types of risky behaviors both at subsidiary and at parent level. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 Chapter 2  
Literature review 
 
The global financial crisis has triggered research concerning the role of foreign banks 
in financial stability.  A stream of research connects firm level data with bank 
characteristics and controls for ownership effects during a very short time period.  
Another strand of literature uses either highly aggregated data or bank level data  
(Sirtaine & Skamnelos, 2007) to examine the lending behavior of banks. A third 
strand of research employs bank level data and examines the effect of ownership on 
lending behavior over an extended period of time. 
 
The first stream of research employs survey data sourced from SMEs. For example, 
Ongena et al. (2013) match banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia with a sample 
of medium and small firms (SMEs). It examines the lending behavior for a short time 
span (2007-2009) around the event of the global financial crisis.  It finds that foreign 
banks and wholesale-funded domestic banks reduced credit more heavily than their 
competitors. Popov and Udell  (2012)  focuses on Eastern European countries and 
compares two years (2005 and 2008).  This paper shows that a stronger presence of 
foreign intermediaries induces either a higher probability of loan applications being 
denied or firms are deterred from applying. Moreover, parent bank “health” matters 
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for credit extensions. The authors find that financially distressed parent banks 
increase the probability of local firms being financially constrained. 
 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) investigated the transmission of the global financial 
crisis across borders. Their analysis is based on highly aggregated data, sourced from 
the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Consolidated International Banking 
Statistics. It compares two short time periods, before and after the global crisis
2
. This 
paper finds that credit supply in emerging markets was affected both through 
contraction in exposures of foreign-owned banks and through domestic banks' retreat 
due to the breakdown of interbank lending.  
 
Cull and Martinez Peria (2013) examined the impact of bank ownership on credit 
growth in Latin America and Eastern Europe immediately before and during the 
2008/2009 crisis. Foreign banks in Eastern Europe fueled loan growth prior to the 
crisis and contracted their loans at a faster pace than domestic banks during the crisis. 
The econometric model they employ enables them to control simultaneously for 
parent bank characteristics; specifically parent equity ratio, parent liquidity and parent 
profitability were found to affect credit growth of subsidiaries'.  
 
Dinger (2009) builds on a database structured along a relatively extended time period 
(1994-2004) while focusing on ten CEE countries. The paper starts with the 
consideration that liquidity flows (including cross border flows) are a fundamental 
feature ensuring stability of the banking sector and therefore aggregate financial 
stability. Foreign banks' liquidity behavior differs significantly from that of domestic 
                                                          
2 
The period between 2006:Q2 and 2007:Q2 is compared to the crisis period of 2008:Q3-2009:Q2
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banks in normal times. For example, foreign owned subsidiaries hold less liquid 
reserves. However, they increase them during times of aggregate liquidity shortages 
in the host country. On aggregate, the study shows that a high degree of foreign bank 
penetration – via subsidiaries - smoothens aggregate liquidity problems.  Foreign 
banks have access to a diversified set of international sources of liquidity. Therefore, 
they are less concerned to withhold assets during tranquil times. In addition, they can 
also increase their volumes in turbulent times. 
 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006) sample the CEE region for the period 1993-2000. 
It finds that foreign banks provide more stable lending than domestic banks. Foreign 
owned banks are more sensitive to host country's growth than domestic banks. The 
authors attribute this evidence to the emergence of internal capital markets within 
financial conglomerates. For example, banking groups tend to reallocate more capital 
to the host countries that have a higher growth. The authors find that subsidiary banks 
(either acquired or newly established) play a crucial role during crises times. They 
continue to expand credit contrary to domestic banks that contract their credit. In 
addition, lower GDP growth in the home country triggers higher credit growth in the 
host country. This finding suggests that international banking group’s substitute 
compensate the poor home market performance via a more pronounced penetration in 
the host markets. However, a declining parent banks’ financial health forces a 
slowdown of subsidiaries’ credit growth, primarily when the subsidiary bank is 
established by the parent and not acquired.  
 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) confirms the findings above employing a 
worldwide sample of 45 multinational for the period 1991-2004. In this paper more 
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parent bank characteristics are added. Parent bank health (loan loss provisions to net 
interest income), profitability, liquidity and interest margins play a more prominent 
role in the case of greenfield, but are proven relevant for all types of subsidiaries.  
 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) includes also the period of the global financial 
crisis. This paper employs bank level data covering a sample of large 48 multinational 
banks with global operations for the period 1992-2009. It finds that multinational 
bank subsidiaries during the credit crunch cut down credit more than the 
counterfactual they constructed - i.e. a sample of domestic banks. Internal capital 
markets seem to operate in all directions. Multinational banks allocate resources to 
that part of the group that is hit by a financial shock. If that shock concerns the core of 
the group, then funding from the periphery can flow to the core or at least parental 
support ceases to exist. 
 
Allen et al. (2015) studies the effect of ownership in 11 CEE countries over the period 
1994-2010.  It compares foreign owned banks (subsidiaries) to domestic owned 
banks. During tranquil periods ownership structure and parent financial characteristics 
are not important for local credit growth. However these factors are significant during 
home and host crisis periods.  During home country crises, subsidiaries owned by 
profitable and solvent parents reduce their lending growth in the host economies. On 
the other hand, large, profitable and solvent parent banks favor credit growth of their 
subsidiaries during a host country crisis.  
 
Jeon et al. (2013) finds that subsidiaries' lending behavior is strongly influenced by 
their parents' financial condition. This paper employs a worldwide sample of 68 large 
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multinational banks with subsidiaries in emerging economies for the period 1994-
2008. It finds that internal capital markets transmit both favorable and adverse shocks. 
They capture this mechanism exploiting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal 
funds. When parents enjoy abundant cash flows, subsidiaries depend less on their own 
funds to expand credit growth. This mechanism was found particularly strong in 
Central and Eastern Europe.  In addition also parent liquidity conditions play a role. 
Chapter 3       
Ownership 
Database and other 
Variables 
 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a CEESE focused sample of 323 banks  operating 
in 18 countries
3
. Banking theory would predict that each individual bank extents 
credit on the grounds of its own financial characteristics and macroeconomic 
conditions. However, a good share of these banks is foreign owned (see Appendix 
Figure B-1 for the evolution over time of the domestic and foreign owned banks 
market shares). Therefore, the aim is also to control for the possibility that foreign 
owned banks are able to extent credit differently than domestic banks because the 
former can leverage on a financial group organization. For example, financial groups 
can manage centralized treasury operations thus generating internal capital market to 
allocate capital across their subsidiary network irrespectively of the subsidiary 
characteristics and domestic (host) economic conditions. Therefore, it is also included 
in the database a set of relevant statistics for the ultimate owner banks (parents). Their 
                                                          
3  Albania, Armenia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria,  Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Lithuania, Latvia, Montenegro, FYROM, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. 
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total number is 87. The constructed database covers the period 2000-2014. Table B-1 
in the Appendix reports the details on the number of banks per country, per category 
(foreign or domestic) and per year of operation. To avoid double counting the merger 
history of each parent and subsidiary bank has been carefully examined. Much 
attention has also been paid on the selection of the accounting regime. Details on the 
selection and data cleaning process are reported in the Appendix (A). 
 
Figure 3-1: Definitions of ownership and their impact on the database 
 
 
As a result, an original and unique dataset has been constructed, which includes time 
series information on banks’ balance sheets as well as variables capturing the time 
varying nature of subsidiaries’ ownership structure. The initial and baseline source 
was Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope. However it has not been adequate and a a wide 
variety of additional sources
4
  served to complement and cross-check the database: 
Amadeus by Bureau van Dijk, published financial statements, S&P IQ capital, 
                                                          
4
 In each case the reliability of the source available is assessed and determines the number of additional 
sources needed in order to cross check the data.  For example, this study always considers audited 
financial statements to be superior to information sourced from commercial databases. 
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Bloomberg, Central bank reports, Ministries’ reports, stock exchanges and news. A 
bank is defined as foreign owned if foreigners hold over 49.9% of the shares as done 
in previous studies. To the contrary, this study introduces a novelty in the definition 
of ownership, which enhances the definition normally utilized in previous studies
5
. 
Specifically, it identified the ultimate owner of each subsidiary bank, instead of 
focusing only on the direct owner. By doing so, it also defined the nationality of the 
ultimate owners of the parent companies and not only their legal headquarters. The 
ultimate ownership definition should allow better capturing cross border economic 
and financial relationships among owners and owned entities. On the other hand, the 
shortcut of identifying direct ownership may not be enough to reach this goal. To 
better gauge the difference between ultimate and direct ownership, below is presented 
a randomly selected example (Figure 3-1) of two banks operating in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It exemplifies the effect of applying the ultimate ownership definition 
and compares the results with another dataset
6
 publicly available. As it can be easily 
grasped from (Figure 3-1 the ultimate owner definition identifies more precisely the 
final owner of an already detected foreign owned bank (example 1) as well as it 
contributes to actually detect a foreign owner otherwise defined as domestic (example 
2).  
 
Table C-2 in the Appendix reports the correlations across our whole sample and Table 
C-3 presents the correlations among the variables that concern only the sub-sample of 
                                                          
5
 De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006), Claessens et al  (2008),  Jeon et al (2013),  Allen et al. (2015) 
6
 The database constructed by Claessens et al. (2008) has been made partially available by the National 
bank of Netherlands. It reveals the nationality of the direct owner but not the name of the identified 
owner. The examples have been drawn randomly and are a comparison of the current data and those 
documented in previous literature. It should be noted also that  previous literature follows the definition 
adopted by Claessens et al. (2008). 
 30 
subsidiaries of multinational financial groups. This serves as a basis to start our 
empirical investigation. 
 
Figure 3-2: Kinds of foreign ownership in the database 
 
 
In the sample foreign owned banks constitute 66% of the total observations (Figure 
3-2). There are two more categories of foreign ownership: (i) banks with a foreign 
entity/ person as major shareholder; (ii) banks owned by a foreign financial group 
(with owned shares above 49.9%). The former category represents 68% of the total 
observation and it is the most ample as it also includes all foreign owned banks. The 
latter category is smaller. It represents 57% of total observations and it is a subsample 
of all foreign owned banks. A good part of the current analysis focuses on this last 
category – as most of the literature does – for a number of reasons stated in section 
Chapter 0. Another reason is that a researcher  can leverage data from financial 
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statements of financial groups, while one cannot determine the financial balance sheet 
individuals, for instance. 
 
Table 3-1 reports the list of variables included in our analysis and their descriptive 
statistics. The dependent variable is credit growth and the variables are collected on 
an annual frequency. As in previous literature, individual bank characteristics are 
included such as capital ratio, liquidity, size, profitability, deposit ratio and asset 
quality.  
 
Capital is defined as economic capital or the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Well-capitalized and liquid banks are expected 
to extend credit more easily. On the other hand, maintaining an exceptionally high 
level of capital and too high liquid assets retentions may also reflect an elevated risk 
aversion thus contributing to slow the expansion of credit (De Haas and Van 
Lelyveld, 2006).  
 
Size is included as the natural logarithm of total assets. Large banks have better 
access to capital markets and tend to raise less expensive capital. This may increase 
their profit margins and improves their lending position (Brissimis & Delis, 2009). 
However, a large bank may have lower incentives to increase further its market share 
or its balance sheet needs to grow less robustly to achieve a substantial amount of new 
lending given the ample size of the existing portfolio. Therefore, its average credit 
growth can be smaller than the average credit of a new, and relatively small, market 
player.   
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Profitability is measured as return on assets. In general, high profitability should 
create incentives to expand activities thus increase credit. However,  some banks with 
a highly profitable strategy may opt for a “quite life” approach and avoid aggressive 
expansions of credit. Moreover incumbents may have cherry picked their clients when 
competition was lower in the past, securing higher profitability. However, those 
opportunities may be less and less when new entrants appear on the market thus even 
highly profitable banks may extend credit at a slower pace.  
 
Table 3-1: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Subsidiary & Host Country charachteristics           
 Variable  Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Credit 
The natural logarithm of loans  3555 13.0 2.0 2.0 17.7 
Economic Capital ratio 
Equity to assets, % 3572 13.7 10.0 0.0 100.0 
Liquidity ratio 
Liquid assets to total assets, % 3569 30.0 19.2 0.0 99.9 
Size 
The logarithm of assets 3572 13.7 1.8 8.4 18.1 
Profitability 
Return on assets, % 3561 0.8 2.8 -33.6 52.7 
Deposit ratio Customer deposits to total 
funding, % 3540 74.5 22.1 0.0 100.0 
Loan Impairments Loan impairment charges to 
loans, % 3354 7.5 18.9 -76.9 100.0 
Real GDP growth 
  3572 3.4 4.1 -16.0 22.9 
Inflation rate 
  3572 5.5 8.9 -2.4 95.0 
Interest rate 
  3572 8.2 5.8 0.2 45.6 
Parent & Home country charachteristics           
  Variable  
Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Parent Profiability 
Return on assets, % 2032 0.4 1.7 -13.5 19.9 
Paren Liquidity 
Liquid assets to total assets, % 2031 21.8 11.5 0.4 83.7 
Parent solvency 
Equity to assets, % 2032 6.0 3.9 -5.5 82.4 
Parent loan impairments Loan impairment charges to 
loans, % 1991 1.2 1.5 -6.3 21.2 
Home country: Real GDP 
growth   2041 1.3 3.0 -16.4 11.1 
 
Home country: Inflation rate   2042 2.8 3.6 -1.3 54.9 
 
 
To account for the deposit rate, the ratio of customer deposits to total funding is 
included. A high deposit rate provides a stable funding source for banks thus a 
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support to credit growth. It is also a signal that banks enjoy the trust of consumers. On 
the other hand a high deposit rate may indicate that banks have difficulty in raising 
funds from the interbank markets, therefore they cannot easily substitute their funding 
sources and leverage on market opportunities when the circumstances require doing 
so.  
 
As a proxy for asset quality is used the ratio of loan impairment charges to average 
gross loans. Non-performing loan figures  were avoided for two reasons. First, there is 
no apparent consensus among regulators of the whole set countries under scrutiny on 
which loans are categorized as NPLs and this obviously affects also write-offs. 
Moreover, write-offs are the outcome of decisions taken even a decade or more before 
the actual write-off action. Therefore, this does not allow us to draw direct inferences 
on the credit expansion policy of current owners. Second, the missing values of the 
NPLs and write-off variables are very much elevated for banks and countries under 
scrutiny. 
 
Impairments are losses incurred if there is objective evidence that impairment of a 
loan or portfolio of loans has occurred. These are flow variables. For example, the 
loan amount recorded in the loan book may be above the present value of the 
estimated future cash flows of the financed asset. As a result this difference must be 
recognized as expense in the income statement. The present value of the estimated 
future cash flows can fall below the book value due to several events, which however 
are not necessarily enough to render a loan non-performing. For example the obligor 
might be in severe financial difficulty (realized losses, cancelled purchased 
agreements from customers, inventory increase, deterioration of profitability), without 
having defaulted on his loan payments yet. Until 2014 impairment charges referred 
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only to material events and would strictly exclude future events. As a result, 
impairment charges represent asset quality deterioration at its very early stage. 
Comparisons across a single market allow someone to speculate on a bank's level of 
portfolio diversification and assess its project pre-screening intelligence. This 
measure is preferred to loan loss provisions because the latter refers to future events 
that may cause impairments. Therefore, its nature could be speculative and allow 
management to shift provisions from one year to another depending on the 
profitability of the bank in a given year thus using provisions as a tool to reduce the 
tax burden. Similarly, banks might provision less after a year sparked with low 
profitability to inflate earnings.   
 
 
Last but least, the study includes controls for macroeconomic and financial factors of 
host and home countries. Real GDP growth is employed, interest rates and inflation 
rate. Real GDP growth controls for aggregate economic growth and captures demand 
side effects. It is expected to have a positive impact on credit growth.  The inflation 
rate is measured as the year-to-year change of the consumer price index. A rise in 
prices is expected to increase demand for loans and also inflate the value of banks’ 
loan portfolios. However, the inflation rate may also reflect instability thus forcing 
banks to ration credit (Boyd, Levine, & Smith, 2001). Therefore, the effect of this 
variable can run in both directions. Finally, controls for interest rates are included.  
High interest rates create an incentive for banks to lend more while they reduce 
clients’ demand for credit. As a result, also the sign of this variable can be positive or 
negative. 
Chapter 4  
Methodology 
4.1. Dynamic credit growth with controls for ownership 
 
In order to gain insight into the impact of ultimate ownership – discriminating 
between foreign and domestic owned banks –a first set of regressions is run. The 
effect of ownership is captured with a dummy variable. Following De Haas & 
Lelyveld (2006), Cull & Martinez (2013) and Bertay et al (2015), the study models 
credit growth as a function of ownership and individual bank characteristics. It also 
controls for macroeconomic effects on credit growth (as in De Haas & Lelyveld, 2006  
and  Bertay et al, 2015).  To account for a possible persistence of credit growth a 
dynamic framework is used (Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2015). Thus, the 
following model is estimated: 
 
ΔLi,t = α0 + α1 ΔLi,t−1 +∑βk Xc,t
𝐾
𝑘=1
+∑γj Zi,t−1
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ φ1Owni,t + k1Crisis + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(4.1) 
 
 
where the error component is decomposed into: εit= vi+ uit, i denotes individual bank 
operating in host country c during year t. Δ Li,t  is the credit growth of  bank i during 
year t. Xc,t   is a vector of host country macroeconomic variables including Inflation 
rate, Interest rate and growth rate of real GDP. Zi,t−1 is a vector of bank specific 
control variables, namely economic capital ratio, liquidity, size, profitability and loan 
impairments. Crisis is a dummy variable for Global financial crisis, which equals 1 
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for the year 2008. Finally Owni,t  is a binary dummy variable for the type of 
ownership of bank i during year t. 
 
The model as written in Equation (4.1) has several potential limitations. First, time-
invariant bank fixed characteristics such as corporate strategy, governance and 
reputation, can be correlated with the other time varying explanatory variables
7
 and 
will be a part of the error term if omitted. The omission of such variables can lead to 
biased estimates. However those variables are unobservable, therefore they should be 
removed from the error term. The standard way to do this is estimating a "fixed 
effects" model, which conducts a "within transformation".  The within transformation 
means that for each bank i Equation (4.1) is averaged over time and then the averages 
are subtracted from the original Equation (4.1). The unobservable individual bank 
characteristics (vi ) are constant over time. As a result, they are removed from the 
error term.  
 
Another problem arises once the lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor 
in the model. The within transformation introduces a correlation between the 
transformed lagged variable (Δ Li,t−1 − 
1
T
∑ ΔLi,t
T−1
t=0 )   and the transformed error 
(εit −
1
T
∑ εit)
T
t=1  because the average error includes εit−1 . The correlation between 
the error and the lagged dependent variable becomes smaller as the number of time 
periods (T) increases, because εit−1 becomes a smaller component of the error term. 
However, this is not the case here since there are few time periods (T=15) relative to 
the number of banks (N=323). Therefore, a fixed effect method gives biased 
estimators for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, which are particularly 
                                                          
7
 For example the reputation of a bank may impact the capability that a bank has in attracting deposits. 
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biased downwards (Nickell, 1981).  If any regressor is correlated to some extent with 
the lagged dependent variable, its coefficient may be seriously biased too. Moreover, 
when a panel is unbalanced and in the presence of endogenous variables, a fixed 
effects estimator is inappropriate to make reliable inferences on the coefficients of all 
regressors (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Here the panel dataset is unbalanced and the 
literature describes the employed regressors as susceptible of following a 
cointegrating process (Brissimis & Delis, 2009).  If bank loans and another balance 
sheet position are strongly correlated it is not clear a priori if/which factor drives the 
other. To deal with this issue all bank characteristics enter the regression with a lag, 
similarly to Jeon, Olivero, & Wu (2013) and Cull & Martinez (2013). This way 
simultaneity can be precluded. However, endogeneity concerns are not fully 
mitigated. A bank might manage its positions in a way that enables it to reach specific 
credit growth targets each year. A bank might manage its capital ratio, liquidity and 
deposit rate in order to enable a certain credit expansion the year ahead. To address 
any endogeneity concerns, a GMM estimation method is employed. GMM estimators 
use lagged variables as instruments. They extract the exogenous component of the 
independent variables, allowing for a consistent estimation of the parameters. 
Specifically a system GMM is selected, which has been found to provide the most 
reliable estimates under all aforementioned circumstances with unbalanced panels 
(Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Roodman, 2006). A two-step estimator is used since it is 
asymptotically more efficient than the respective one-step estimator. However, this 
procedure introduces a downward bias in the standard errors. To correct for this, 
Windmeijer's correction is employed. Moreover robust standard errors are used. 
Estimation results of a Fixed Effects model and difference GMM model will be 
provided for reference. 
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A system GMM estimator estimates a two-equation system: i) a levels' equation 
instrumenting it with first differences of variables and ii) first differences the panel 
and instruments this equation with the lagged variables' levels (Blundell & Bond, 
1998). Instead of the first differences the study employs forward orthogonal 
deviations from the sample mean, a modification introduced by Arellano and Bover 
(1995). In order to eliminate the fixed effect from the error term, the average of all 
available future observations is subtracted, instead of subtracting the past observation. 
This method performs better than first differences (Hayakawa, 2009).   
 
To address potential endogeneity of bank financials and avoid instrument 
proliferation, those are instrumented with their second, third and the fourth lag
8
 and 
the backward orthogonal deviations transformation is applied to the instruments for 
the transformed equation
9
. Macroeconomic conditions and ownership variables are 
treated as exogenous. It has been taken care that results are always conforming to the 
rule of thumb to maintain the number of instruments below the number of individual 
banks (Roodman, 2006). Two tests are available to check the joint validity of the 
instruments, Sargan and Hansen J. Sargan’s statistic is inconsistent when non 
sphericity is suspected in the errors (Roodman, 2006). During the sample period both 
global and the Eurozone crisis introduce a deviation from sphericity in the form of 
heteroscedasticity in the data. Moreover, whenever ownership changes, shocks to 
                                                          
8
 In the Difference GMM have been used the second to the fifth lag as instruments and backward and 
orthogonal deviations.  
9
 The combination of backward orthogonal deviations for the instruments and forward for the 
regressors is less biased and more stable than traditional transformation especially for Difference 
GMM estimations (Hayakawa, 2009). 
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individual banks are also a reason to avoid reliance on Sargan’s statistic. Instead, the 
study relies upon Hansen’s J statistic to check the selection of instruments.      
 
The model described above -Equation (4.1)- are estimated three times, using each time 
a different definition for ownership. The first one is captured with a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the largest shareholder is foreign (irrespectively of the percentage 
owned). For example, the largest foreign shareholder may hold 10% of shares and not 
a controlling stake. A second dummy is taking value 1 if the largest shareholder is 
foreign and controls the bank owning more than 49.9% of total shares. As for the 
previous definition of foreign ownership, the identity of the owner can be diverse: a 
commercial entity, an individual or another bank. The third ownership dummy equals 
1 if the largest shareholder is foreign, controls the bank with a percentage of shares 
over 49.9% and the owner can be clearly identified with a financial group, thus 
excluding the other categories previously included. This latter categorization allows 
the identification of a subsidiary as a "member of a financial group".  
 
4.2. Crossed Random Effects Models 
 
The objective of this section is to investigate further the origins of the heterogeneity 
of loan growth across subsidiaries belonging to different international financial 
groups (referred thereafter as "parents") and operating in different markets. Multilevel 
models are to answer these questions (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). An 
examination of the structure of the data is required to choose the best model. Over 
time ownership of a subsidiary may change. A single financial group can own several 
banks in a given year. As a result, there are many combinations of bank-year, 
financial group-year and bank-financial group occurring multiple times (see Appendix 
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Figure C-1 for an exemplification). A Crossed Random Effects Model (Chapter 11, 
Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008) is chosen to conduct the analysis. Parent 
characteristics may affect subsidiaries’ credit growth as well as regional market 
developments common to all banks. A crossed random effects model allows for a 
clear distinction between parent bank and market dynamics. It also addresses the 
quantification of the relative importance of those effects.  There are also included 
controls for country specific specificities, namely the country of operation of the 
subsidiary and the country of residence of the parent bank.  
 
The initial stage of the investigation hypothesizes that all subsidiaries are affected 
similarly by some events in a given year. Therefore, the study considers the main 
effect of time and treats years as crossed with the observations. Moreover, it is 
assumed that being part of a specific financial group translates into a common 
corporate culture, strategy and financial conditions affecting each single subsidiary in 
the same way, irrespectively of the market of operation. The above hypotheses can be 
tested through the estimation of the following model: 
 
Δ Li,t = α0 +∑βk Xc,t
K
k=1
+∑γj Zi,t−1
J
j=1
 +  k1 Crisis
⏟                          
fixed components
 + ζ1t  +  ζ2p  +   εitp⏟      
random components
 (4.2) 
 
 
Letter i denotes subsidiary, c host country, t year and p the parent. ζ1t is a random 
intercept for years, ζ2p is a random intercept for parents and  εitp  is a residual error 
term. α0  is the mean intercept. The random variables ensure that the intercept 
(α0 + ζ1t + ζ2p ) is unique and random to every parent and year. The random intercept 
for years ζ1t is shared across all subsidiaries for a given year, whereas the random 
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intercept for parents ζ2p  is shared by all years for a given parent. Xc,t is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, Zi,t−1 is a vector of bank specific control variables and 
Crisis is a dummy variable for Global financial crisis. 
 
The estimation of Equation (4.2) demands the assumption that the error term has a 
zero mean and is independent across banks and years. Moreover, the random 
intercepts ζ1t  & ζ2p  have zero means, are independent of each other, across years and 
across financial groups, independent of all right hand variables and uncorrelated with 
εitp. These assumptions force the omission of the lagged dependent variable from the 
regressors.  ζ2p  represents the combined effect on credit growth of all unobserved 
parent  specific variables that do not change over time. It is a determinant both of 
credit growth and of lagged credit growth. Once the lagged dependent variable is 
included, ζ2p  ceases to be statistically independent of it.  
 
A second Crossed Random Effects Model allows for an interaction between years and 
parents. Therefore, the assumption of parents and years exerting independent effects 
is relaxed. Instead, the study accounts for the possibility that some events during year 
t may be more detrimental or beneficial to a certain parent and less to another. 
Therefore, the model in Equation (4.2) becomes:   
 
Δ Li,t = α0 +∑βk Xc,t
K
k=1
+∑γj Zi,t−1
J
j=1
 + k1 Crisis
⏟                          
fixed components
 +   ζ1t  +  ζ2p + ζ3tp  +  εitp⏟                
random components
 
 
(4.3) 
 
where ζ1t is a random intercept for years, ζ2p is a random term for parents and ζ3tp is 
a random term for parents interacted with years. ζ3tp is assumed independent of the 
 43 
other random terms  ζ1t &  ζ2p and across combinations of years and parents. The 
residual term  εitp represents the deviation of a subsidiary's response from the mean 
for year t and financial group p.  
 
A way to interpret the relative magnitude of the random variance components is 
calculating the intra-class correlations (ρ). This is a measure of how much of the total 
variance is attributed to the random components. This indicator increases under 
positively correlated events. For example, it is higher when the responses of the single 
observations are more alike. Its value can range between 0% and 100%.  0% means 
that observations in a certain cluster have nothing in common. Therefore, the 
grouping makes no sense. 100% means absolute agreement and no variance across 
individual observations.  
 
The models allow us to calculate the following intra-class correlations
10
:  
Subsidiaries operating during the same year but belong to different parents 
 
ρ(year) =
σ  ζ
2
1t
 
σ  ζ
2
1t
 +  σ  ζ
2
2p
+ σ  ζ
2
3tp
 + σ  εitp
2   
 (4.4) 
 
Subsidiaries belonging to the same parent but operate during different years 
 
ρ(parent) =
σ  ζ
2
2t
 
σ  ζ
2
1t
 +  σ  ζ
2
2p
+ σ  ζ
2
3tp
 +  σ  εitp
2   
 (4.5) 
 
Subsidiaries belonging to the same parent and operating during the same year 
                                                          
10 Chapter 11.6, page 485 in Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal,2008 
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ρ(year, parent) =
σ  ζ
2
1t
 +  σ  ζ
2
2p
+ σ  ζ
2
3tp
 
σ  ζ
2
1t
 + σ  ζ
2
2p
+ σ  ζ
2
3tp
 +  σ  εitp
2   
 (4.6) 
 
Equation (4.6) can also be calculated after the estimation of Equation (4.2), assuming 
σ  ζ
2
3tp
 equal to 0.  
 
The host and home country effects have also been investigated. To do so, in Equation 
(4.2) and Equation (4.3) the random effect of parent has been replaced with a random 
effect of host/home country and the interaction of this random effect with years.  
 
The estimation results of all these models are employed as an indicator of those 
factors that matter for subsidiary credit extensions. Therefore, these results are used to 
improve the baseline specification, thus including interaction and time-varying 
characteristics as required.  
 
4.3. Dynamic credit growth with controls for parent's financials 
 
The results stemming from the exercise conducted with the models in section 0 
indicate that the heterogeneity of credit growth across subsidiaries to a large extent 
can be attributed to time variant parent characteristics. Therefore, the nexus parent-
subsidiaries must be investigated further. This is achieved with the inclusion of 
factors affecting subsidiaries owned by the same parent. Conceptually the dummy for 
ownership included in Equation (4.1) is substituted with a set of parent banks’ balance 
sheet characteristics, namely: bank profitability, solvency, liquidity and asset quality. 
Parent deposit ratio is excluded, because parent banks do not ground their 
international expansion strategies and decisions on this ratio. Finally the study 
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controls for growth and demand conditions in the home country because these may 
affect expansion of credit at subsidiary level.   
 
The Dynamic Model becomes: 
 
Δ Li,t = α0 + α1 Δ Li,t−1 +∑βk Xc,t
K
k=1
+∑γj Zi,t−1
J
j=1
 + ∑δk PXηt
K
k=1
  
+∑ψj PZp,t−1
J
j=1
 + k1 Crisis + εit 
 
(4.7) 
 
The error component εit is decomposed into: εit= vi+ uit, as time invariant subsidiary 
specific characteristics potentially are assumed to be correlated with the regressors. i 
denotes subsidiary operating in host country c during year t and belonging to parent p, 
which is headquartered in country η.  Δ Li,t  is the credit growth of  subsidiary i during 
year t, which is included as explanatory variable too with one year lag. Xc,t   is a 
vector of host country macroeconomic variables including Inflation rate, Interest rate 
and growth rate of real GDP. Zi,t−1 is a vector of subsidiary specific control variables, 
namely economic capital ratio, liquidity, size, profitability and loan impairments. 
 𝑃Xη,t is a vector of parent's home country macroeconomic variables (Inflation rate, 
Interest rate and real GDP growth). 𝑃Zi,t−1  is a vector of parent specific control 
variables, namely the economic capital ratio of the parent, parent liquidity,  parent 
profitability and loan impairments. Finally Crisis is a dummy variable for Global 
financial crisis, which equals 1 for the year 2008.  
 
The preferred estimation method is a system GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations. Subsidiaries' balance sheet variables are treated as potentially endogenous 
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for the reasons described in section Chapter 65466 and are instrumented  with their 
second lag
11
. A two-step system GMM estimator is employed with Windmeijer's 
correction and robust standard errors. Difference GMM and Fixed effects estimation 
results are reported also. The new element is the treatment of the financial 
characteristics of the parents. Parent's credit extension policy is steered by the 
conglomerates' strategic decisions, which can change over time. Those can affect both 
the credit growth in a certain country and the capital structure at consolidated level. 
Parents might target certain profitability and certain credit growth in each country and 
set targets for each country manager. Therefore, parents adjust their capital structure, 
liquidity and other financials in a way to render subsidiaries' targets feasible.  
Strategic decisions are an omitted variable for which a researcher cannot control and 
which affect the independent variable and the variables at parent level. Therefore, an 
omitted variable bias may generate endogeneity. Following previous literature (De 
Haas & Van Lelyveld, 2010; Jeon, Olivero, & Wu, 2013), this study precludes any 
endogeneity issues on the ground of the subsidiaries' relative size compared with their 
parent. If the subsidiary is small relative to the overall group size the omitted variable 
bias is considered to have an immaterial effect on the results. In the present study, the 
average subsidiary accounts for about 2.3 per cent of its parent bank’s assets12, while 
in De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) the average subsidiary is 10 per cent of the 
parent bank. Parent bank characteristics are included with one year lag. Moreover, 
                                                          
11
 When a Difference GMM estimator is employed, those variables are instrumented with their second 
and third lag.  
12
 There are 2040 subsidiary observations out of which a) 1755 constitute less than 10% of the parent, 
b) 72 are above 10% and below 20% of the parent; c) 13 observations are above 20% of the parent 
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they are included as exogenous instruments only for the levels' equation, where they 
are assumed uncorrelated with the contemporaneous error
13
.
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Following Stata's help file for the xtabond2 command. Here it is implicitly assumed that once parent 
bank characteristics are transformed into differences they cease to be exogenous, therefore they are 
treated as predetermined variables.  When a difference GMM model is estimated, the transformation of 
those variables is prevented and they are included as levels.  
Chapter 5     
Results 
 
5.1. Dynamic credit growth and ownership  
 
The first set of regressions investigates the effect of ownership on credit growth at 
subsidiary level. Equation (4.1) is estimated using a system GMM model controlling 
for all types of foreign ownership of the banks in our sample. Table 5-1 reports the 
estimation results. It includes a set of models including a different set of dummy 
variables, which capture different definitions of foreign ownership. As a result, all 
types of foreign ownership are significant and exert a positive effect on subsidiaries’ 
credit growth. Foreign participated banks tend to extend credit more than their 
domestically owned competitors. Consequently, foreign ownership matters.  
 
 
Yet, the types of foreign participation might not be equally important to the host 
market economies.  Members of financial groups might drive the results of all types 
of banks with a relatively large foreign shareholder. The reason is that those constitute 
the largest majority of all the banks with some sort of foreign participation in their 
ownership structure. As reported in Figure 3-2, 67% of the total observations are 
banks whose largest shareholder is foreign and 57% are banks controlled by foreign 
financial groups. Table 5-2 reports further regressions including a binary variable for 
a) an owner being a foreign financial group and holding over 50% of shares b) a 
foreign non-financial entity/individual holding over 50% of shares c) a foreign entity/ 
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individual being majority shareholder and holding less than 50% of shares. Those 
categories are mutually exclusive and are compared to domestic banks without any 
sort of foreign participation.  
 
Table 5-1: Factors affecting loan growth - estimations based on Equation (4.1) – including 
different definitions of foreign ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Loan Growth 
The majority 
shareholder 
A foreigner  
owns 
A financial group 
owns 
 is a foreigner at least 50% of shares at least 50% of shares 
    
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.261*** 0.260*** 0.261*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag -0.388** -0.411** -0.430** 
 (0.181) (0.182) (0.178) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.493*** 0.482*** 0.480*** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.084) 
Size, 1st lag -5.032*** -5.166*** -5.291*** 
 (1.120) (1.121) (1.144) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.558*** 1.556*** 1.583*** 
 (0.557) (0.558) (0.555) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag -0.021 -0.017 -0.017 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.069 -0.087 -0.091 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.089) 
GDP growth 1.054*** 1.150*** 1.142*** 
 (0.181) (0.167) (0.172) 
Inflation rate 0.683*** 0.494*** 0.487** 
 (0.191) (0.189) (0.189) 
Interest rate -0.552** -0.334 -0.354 
 (0.218) (0.213) (0.216) 
Global financial crisis -7.970*** -7.416*** -7.479*** 
 (1.648) (1.623) (1.625) 
Owner: largest shareholder foreign 7.048***   
 (1.665)   
Owner: at least 50% foreign   7.115***  
ownership  (1.668)  
Owner: foreign financial group   5.999*** 
   (1.739) 
Constant 69.144*** 70.359*** 75.031*** 
 (19.149) (19.103) (19.095) 
Observations 2,775 2,775 2,775 
Number of id 310 310 310 
No of instruments 306 306 306 
AR-2  0.512 0.518 0.527 
Hansen J 0.403 0.403 0.435 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator (system 
GMM) was used to produce the results above.  'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average 
autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which 
is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of 
loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a 
dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed in %.  
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Results indicate that all kinds of foreign participated banks have a higher propensity 
to extent credit than purely domestic banks. All types of foreign participation in the 
ownership structure are crucial to the performance of the subsidiary, with members of 
foreign financial groups bearing the largest influence and most significant one. 
Moreover, members of foreign financial groups constitute the most uniform category 
of foreign ownership in terms of business objectives, financial structure and 
operation. On the other hand, among the foreign non-financials owners one can see 
individuals, industrials, international institutions and funds originated from the 
Middle East.  Given that members of financial groups cover the vast majority of cases 
too, the rest of the research focuses on this category of foreign ownership alike 
previous literature i.e.  De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006; 2010; 2014), Allen et al. 
(2015), Cull and Martinez Peria (2013).  
 
 
Constraining the analysis to the definition of foreign ownership as membership to 
financial groups, Equation (4.1) is re-estimated using different methods to check the 
robustness of the previous findings. Results are reported in Table 5-3. Economic 
growth and inflation rate in the host country correlate positively with individual bank 
credit growth. This supports the idea that higher growth triggers credit growth as well 
as more robust inflation generates larger asset price increases, ultimately stimulating 
more credit via amplified asset evaluations. On the other hand, interest rates have a 
negative effect on credit growth. This suggests that borrowers are more reluctant to 
demand more debt when interest rates move up. The global financial crisis of 2008 
was also detected to be detrimental to credit expansion. 
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Past loan growth has a positive effect on current credit growth. However, bank’s size 
has a negative impact suggesting that large banks expand their loan portfolio at a 
slower pace. Finally, higher liquidity levels and partially profitability have a positive 
effect on credit growth as expected. To the contrary, the quality of assets (loan  
Table 5-2: Estimations based on Equation (4.1) – including the effect of mutually exclusive 
definitions of foreign ownership versus purely domestically owned banks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Loan Growth 
A financial group 
owns 
Foreign non-
financials 
Foreigners are majority 
shareholders  
 at least 50% of shares own over 50% and own less than 50% 
    
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.248*** 0.290*** 0.210*** 
 (0.029) (0.052) (0.038) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag -0.338* 0.041 -1.120 
 (0.196) (0.260) (0.719) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.513*** 0.322** 0.466** 
 (0.089) (0.155) (0.197) 
Size, 1st lag -6.192*** -2.270 -12.630*** 
 (1.261) (1.755) (3.486) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.030* 2.077*** 2.038* 
 (0.571) (0.774) (1.043) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag -0.072 -0.002 -0.066 
 (0.061) (0.081) (0.185) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.063 0.177 0.020 
 (0.098) (0.216) (0.295) 
GDP growth 1.154*** 0.818*** 0.310 
 (0.212) (0.312) (0.488) 
Inflation rate 0.148 0.385 0.320 
 (0.146) (0.268) (0.298) 
Interest rate -0.204 -0.195 -0.292 
 (0.205) (0.268) (0.710) 
Global financial crisis -5.782*** -5.638* -2.982 
 (1.692) (3.400) (4.166) 
A foreign financial group owns over 50% 8.270***   
 (2.295)   
Foreign non-financials own over 50%  6.260**  
  (2.559)  
Foreigners are majority shareholders    6.688* 
and own less than 50%   (3.752) 
Constant 87.245*** 26.733 186.018*** 
 (20.834) (29.297) (54.168) 
Observations 2,485 1,052 894 
No of banks 291 159 130 
No of instruments 243 145 90 
AR-2  0.630 0.736 0.362 
Hansen J 0.162 0.880 0.622 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The estimation method employed here is the System 
GMM  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. 'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average 
autocovariance in the residuals is of order 3. 'Hansen J' is  the p-value of the  Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which 
is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the  null of instrument validity. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All 
ratios are expressed in %. 
 
impairment charges ratio) affects negatively credit extensions. Ceteris paribus, 
members of foreign financial groups consistently have a higher propensity to expand 
credit. This is in contrast with Allen et al (2015), who found ownership structure 
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insignificant. It contrasts also De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006), who show 
ownership to matter per se only during periods of financial crises. Cull & Martinez 
(2013), report that ownership matters in CEESE countries concerning solely the 
growth of corporate loans.  The only study that reaches a result similar to this one was 
conducted by Bakker et al. (2013) and constitutes part of an IMF's report concerning 
the current region of focus.  
Table 5-3: Factors affecting loan growth - estimations based on Equation (4.1) – including 
the effect of being a member of a foreign financial group (subsidiary bank) 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Loan Growth FE sys GMM Diff GMM sys GMM diff GMM 
      
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.154*** 0.261*** 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.094* 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.046) (0.049) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.121 -0.430** 0.167 -0.200 0.880 
 (0.163) (0.178) (0.299) (0.658) (0.693) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.488*** 0.480*** 0.632*** 0.430*** 0.560*** 
 (0.050) (0.084) (0.132) (0.165) (0.163) 
Size, 1st lag -16.268*** -5.291*** -15.898*** -7.814** -26.958*** 
 (1.362) (1.144) (2.575) (3.549) (8.835) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.096*** 1.583*** 0.944 1.259 0.804 
 (0.400) (0.555) (0.680) (0.886) (0.752) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag -0.004 -0.017 -0.160 0.054 -0.585*** 
 (0.065) (0.054) (0.118) (0.144) (0.185) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.115*** -0.091 -0.443*** -0.328** -0.106 
 (0.040) (0.089) (0.155) (0.154) (0.169) 
GDP growth 0.878*** 1.142*** 0.838*** 0.377 0.650** 
 (0.148) (0.172) (0.163) (0.332) (0.277) 
Inflation rate 0.521** 0.487** 0.467** 0.615** 0.165 
 (0.210) (0.189) (0.211) (0.306) (0.279) 
Interest rate -0.984*** -0.354 -0.838*** -0.921* -0.959*** 
 (0.256) (0.216) (0.284) (0.500) (0.357) 
Member of a foreign financial group 14.295*** 5.999*** 12.826*** 9.421** 13.270*** 
 (3.835) (1.739) (4.421) (4.143) (3.425) 
Global financial crisis -1.365 -7.479*** -3.470**   
 (1.398) (1.625) (1.705)   
Constant 219.891*** 75.031***  93.691  
 (22.388) (19.095)  (57.049)  
      
Year dummies NO NO NO YES YES 
      
Observations 2,775 2,775 2,465 2,775 2,465 
R-squared 0.433     
No of banks 310 310 292 310 292 
No of instruments  306 271 101 93 
AR-2   0.527 0.674 0.145 0.458 
Hansen J  0.435 0.312 0.156 0.501 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual 
bank fixed effects with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  
diff GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors.'AR-2' is the 
p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 3. 'Hansen J' is  the p-
value of the  Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the  null of 
instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit 
ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed 
in %. 
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The question that follows is why being a member of a financial group per se means a 
larger propensity to extent credit. Those banks might enjoy different levels in their 
fundamentals that allow them to behave differently. To assess that, the first guess is to 
conduct an independent samples' t-test. However, current data violate the normality 
assumptions concerning the distribution of some of the variables (Schmider, Ziegler, 
Danay, Beyer, & Bühner, 2010)14. Therefore, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is the 
best solution, since it is a non-parametric analog to the t-test. Results are reported in 
Table 5-4. With the exception of profitability, domestic banks differ in all other 
financial fundamentals to members of foreign financial groups.  
 
 
Table 5-4: Statistical test on differences in the level of characteristics between foreign owned 
banks and domestic banks 
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test results 
 Economic 
Capital 
Profitability Liquidity Size Loan 
Impairments 
Deposit ratio 
z -
statistic 
7.720 1.413 9.727 -20.419 5.619 12.234 
P-value 0.0000 0.1577 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Result: Domestic 
banks exhibit 
significantly 
higher 
economic 
capital 
Not 
significant 
differences 
between the 
two bank 
categories 
Domestic 
banks 
exhibit 
significantly 
higher 
liquidity 
rates 
Members of 
foreign 
financial 
groups are 
significantly 
larger 
Domestic 
banks have a 
higher loan 
impairment 
rate 
Domestic 
banks have a 
higher 
deposit ratio 
 
 
 
Given these results, it is investigated if the differences in the level of the determinants 
imply a different impact to foreign and domestic banks' credit growth. To evaluate 
this possibility a Chow test is conducted using fixed effects estimations with robust 
standard errors.  The null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the two groups of 
                                                          
14 Particularly capital ratio, profitability and loan impairment ratio violate the cut-off rule of skew<|2.| 
and kurtosis<|9.0| according to Schmider et al (2010)  
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banks are the same. This hypothesis is rejected
15
. Equation (4.1) is re-estimated across 
the two categories of banks, domestic and members of foreign financial groups, and 
eliminating the ownership variable. Results are reported in Table 5-5 and exhibit three 
main differences between domestic banks and members of foreign financial groups. 
Subsidiary banks' lending is pro-cyclical, while domestically owned banks seem 
irresponsive to the cycle in the host country. Capital conditions also affect more 
domestic banks than foreign owned banks, whereby higher capital limits domestic 
banks credit extensions. Finally, foreign owned banks have been more negatively 
impacted by the global financial crisis.   
 
 
The estimation results of Model (2) in Table 5-5 are most probably biased. The reason 
is that one of the assumptions required for the estimation of a system GMM model, 
cross-sectional independence, is susceptible to violation. Errors might be cross-
correlated due to an omitted effect common across some subsidiaries. Several foreign 
banks share the same owner. This translates into shared management, risk 
management systems, same growth / profitability targets, etc. This causes a 
contemporaneous correlation of the residuals of those banks belonging to the same 
financial group. On top of this, members of the same financial group share the same 
funding sources from the same parent bank. Parent banks issue loans to their 
subsidiaries, having a direct impact in the liquidity of their subsidiaries. The amounts 
of intragroup loans are a function of the parent banks own financial position. 
Therefore, a shock at the parent level affects equally the liquidity levels of its 
subsidiaries.  
 
                                                          
15
 The F-statistic  is F(11, 288) =3.49 & the p-value=0.0001 
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Table 5-5: Estimations based on Equation (4.1) using the sub-sample of domestic banks 
(Model 1) and the sub-sample of financial group members (Model 2)  
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
Loan Growth 
Domestic banks Members of foreign  
financial groups 
   
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.229*** 0.238*** 
 (0.043) (0.039) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag -1.282* 0.036 
 (0.770) (0.291) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.419* 0.650*** 
 (0.214) (0.114) 
Size, 1st lag -12.441*** -4.253*** 
 (3.641) (1.210) 
Profitability, 1st lag 2.156** 2.615*** 
 (1.052) (0.701) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag -0.035 -0.093 
 (0.203) (0.080) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.048 0.041 
 (0.295) (0.096) 
GDP growth 0.309 1.430*** 
 (0.383) (0.251) 
Inflation rate 0.853** 0.396 
 (0.380) (0.287) 
Interest rate -0.596 -0.305 
 (0.634) (0.327) 
Global financial crisis -5.651 -8.364*** 
 (3.485) (1.844) 
Constant 185.530*** 58.296*** 
 (56.317) (21.024) 
   
Observations 891 1,658 
No of banks 129 198 
No of instruments 89 172 
AR-2 0.395 0.655 
Hansen J 0.640 0.147 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
The estimation method employed here is the System GMM  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. 'AR-2' is 
the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 3. 
'Hansen J' is  the p-value of the  Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed 
as chi2 under the  null of instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of 
loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global 
financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed in %. 
 
At the presence of cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances, the employment of 
many conventional panel estimators produces inconsistent estimations and misleading 
inferences (Chudik & Pesaran, 2013). Especially as the cross-sectional dimension (N) 
grows large for a fixed number of years (T), the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) produces inconsistent estimates (Sarafidis & Robertson, 2009). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to implement any of the available tests for cross-
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sectional independence in the current panel data (Sarafidis & Hoyos, 2006). There are 
insufficient common observations across the panel to perform them. Nevertheless, the 
contemporaneous independence assumption should be relaxed. Reports on the modus 
operandi of financial groups in the region, i.e. Bakker et al (2013), and some limited 
empirical findings i.e. Jeon et al (2013), De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), point in 
this direction. Once this assumption is removed from the analysis, it must be replaced 
with others concerning the nature of the dependence between the observations. Those 
assumptions will point either to a different estimation method, or to a re-estimation of 
the baseline model with the inclusion of more controls. 
 
The next section reports some auxiliary empirical results, which are guiding the 
formulation of the subsidiary interdependence assumptions. This study is the first to 
test empirically those assumptions. A Cross Random effects Model is estimated. This 
will help testing if there is any resemblance in the credit behavior between members 
of foreign financial groups. If this holds, then it can be investigated if this 
resemblance is derived from fixed characteristics of the parent bank or time varying 
characteristics. Those empirical findings will guide the inclusion of further parent 
bank variables/controls as well as parent related such as the country of origin of the 
parent and the macroeconomic conditions in the home country.  
 
5.2. Second set of Models: controlling for the participation in a specific 
financial group and year effects 
 
Results in section 5.1 indicate that belonging to a financial group implies that banks 
extend credit more than their domestically owned competitors. The question that 
follows is whether a specific financial group  (parent) and its characteristics matter for  
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Table 5-6: Crossed Random Effects Models with controls for the parent effect 
Dependent variable: Loan 
Growth 
(1) (2) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.303
**
 0.328
**
 
 (0.108) (0.107) 
Liquidity , 1st lag 0.309
***
 0.312
***
 
 (0.0457) (0.0452) 
Size , 1st lag -4.462
***
 -4.291
***
 
 (0.574) (0.558) 
Profitability , 1st lag 1.128
***
 1.054
**
 
 (0.329) (0.327) 
Deposit ratio , 1st lag 0.0191 0.0162 
 (0.0327) (0.0319) 
Asset Quality , 1st lag 0.0230 0.00942 
 (0.0334) (0.0328) 
GDP growth 1.330
***
 1.333
***
 
 (0.239) (0.243) 
Inflation rate 0.675
**
 0.686
**
 
 (0.250) (0.246) 
Long term Interest Rate -0.449
*
 -0.470
*
 
 (0.215) (0.211) 
Global financial crisis -4.109 -4.307 
 (9.611) (9.808) 
Constant 66.18
***
 63.94
***
 
 (9.974) (9.793) 
Random effects 
Year effect (σ  ζ1t) 
sd(constant) 12.33*** 12.51*** 
 (2.456) (2.515) 
Parent effect (σ  ζ2p) 
sd(constant) 13.06*** 12.86*** 
 (2.021) (2.052) 
Parent * year (σ  ζ3tp) 
sd(constant)  7.815*** 
  (1.378) 
Residual, Standard Deviation year (σ  εitp) 
 
23.68*** 22.60*** 
 
 (0.421) (0.496) 
 
N 1746 1746 
Log Likelihood -8089.3 -8081.9 
AIC 16206.7 16193.8 
BIC 16283.2 16275.8 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
subsidiary's credit growth. In addition, it is tested the changing (or not) nature of this 
relationship. To do so, Equation (4.2) is estimated, which accounts for time invariant 
parent level effects and year effects that are common across all banks in the sample - 
Model (1) in Table 5-6. Equation (4.3) is also estimated, that accounts for a parent 
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bank-year interaction on top of the effects of Model (1). Therefore, the study allows 
for changing circumstances to affect differently each parent - Model (2) Table 5-6.  
 
The best model among the two is the one that optimizes the Bayesian  & Akaike 
information criteria (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). Model (2) results satisfy these 
criteria. Moreover a likelihood ratio test indicates that the parent-year interaction 
should be included in the model
16
  . 
 
Liquidity, profitability and economic growth support credit expansion (Table 5-6). 
Subsidiary's economic capital is positive and significant. The global financial crisis, 
although with a negative sign, ceases to be significant compared to the results in the 
previous section. The reason is that its effect is picked up by the random part, where 
the study has allowed a parent effect and time to bear a different impact upon each 
parent (i.e. interaction year-parent). The constant represents the average propensity of 
subsidiaries to extent credit. The random effects component defines by how much 
subsidiaries deviate from this average. All variances in the random component are 
significantly different from zero. Specifically σ  ζ1t ≠ 0 implies that the average credit 
growth varies across years. The non-zero estimate for parent (σ  ζ2p ≠ 0) indicates 
that there is a significant variation in average credit growth across parents. Last but 
not least, σ  ζ3p ≠ 0 indicates that the latter variation is time varying. 
 
Table 5-7: Intra-class Correlations based on estimates of Equation (4.3) controlling for the 
parent effect  
% resemblance between subsidiaries due to: 
a) operating in the same year while belonging to different parents 17% 
b) belonging to the same parent (not time varying parent effect) 18% 
c) belonging to the same parent (allowing for time varying effects) 42% 
                                                          
16The chi2 statisitc is  14.67 and the p-value is 0.0001 
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To quantify the relative importance of factors at the parent level, the intra-class 
correlation statistic is used. According to Table 5-7, differences across years account 
for 17% of credit growth variation in the sample. Intra-class correlation of 
subsidiaries of the same parent and operating during the same year amounts to 42%. 
This is a high value. It points to a large impact of the parent features on subsidiaries’ 
credit growth. For subsidiaries belonging to the same parent and operating across 
different years the intra-class correlation drops to 18%. This means that subsidiaries 
belonging to the same parent over the whole period bear much less resemblance with 
each other than subsidiaries of the same parent and operating in the same year. This 
means that time invariant parent specificities are less crucial than their time varying 
characteristics. As a result, subsidiaries of the same parent resemble very much each 
other in terms of credit growth within a given year. The majority of the subsidiaries 
falling into this category are operating in different countries, under different 
regulatory regimes, face different macroeconomic policies and different market 
conditions. Still they exhibit a surprising similarity in their credit growth. This is 
attributed to the fact that they all face the same budget constrains which are imposed 
at consolidated level and are set by the parent’s financial conditions. It is crucial to 
incorporate this dimension in our dynamic model. 
 
5.2.1. Host country effect and credit growth  
 
What follows is a variation of the crossed random effects models, where the parent 
effect is replaced with the host country effect. The aim is to see how similar are 
subsidiaries operating in the same country and examine the relative importance of 
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country fixed characteristics versus time varying ones. Results are reported in Table 
5-8. The two information criteria and a log likelihood ratio test
17
 indicate that the 
second model is preferred over the first.   
 
Table 5-8: Crossed Random Effects Models that control for the host country effect 
 (1) (2) 
   
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.0543 0.0393 
 (0.0955) (0.0933) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.303*** 0.294*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0435) 
Size, 1st lag -4.231*** -3.994*** 
 (0.515) (0.506) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.033** 0.865** 
 (0.335) (0.328) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag  -0.00104 -0.0132 
 (0.0306) (0.0296) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag 0.0503 0.0704* 
 (0.0342) (0.0330) 
GDP growth 1.331*** 1.388*** 
 (0.248) (0.335) 
Inflation rate 0.732** 0.861* 
 (0.272) (0.344) 
Interest rate -0.598* -0.494 
 (0.237) (0.291) 
Global financial crisis -5.018 -5.297 
 (9.612) (10.21) 
Constant 67.95*** 64.77*** 
 (9.182) (9.290) 
 
Year effect 
sd(constant) 12.31*** 12.76*** 
 (2.458) (2.656) 
Host Country effect 
sd(constant) 2.536* 0.000000385* 
 (0.941) (0.00000255) 
Year* Host Country 
sd(constant)  12.95*** 
  (2.000) 
   
Residual, Standard Deviation 
 24.77*** 23.05*** 
 (0.423) (0.434) 
N 1747 1747 
Log Likelihood -8115.8 -8080.5 
AIC 16259.7 16190.9 
BIC 16336.2 16272.9 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
                                                          
17 The chi2 statistics is 69.04 and the p-value is 0.0000 
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The magnitude and significance of the estimates combined with the intra-class 
correlation statistics in Table 5-9, indicate that time invariant host country effects can 
be ignored, while time varying are statistically relevant. Such a result can be 
attributed to the fact that those countries are still in a transitory period, with a still 
changing institutional, legislative and regulatory frameworks. Their economic 
situation seems to vary across the years thus impacting on credit growth.  
 
Table 5-9 Intra-class Correlations based on estimates of Equation (4.3) controlling for the host 
country effect 
% resemblance between subsidiaries due to: 
a) operating in the same year and in different countries 18% 
b) operating in the same country across different years 0% 
c) operating in the same year and in the same country 38% 
 
Subsidiaries operating in the same host country and during the same year resemble 
each other by 38% in the way they extent credit. Parents seem to have similar 
expectations about the prospects of each country, which causes subsidiaries in each 
country to behave much alike. Moreover subsidiaries operating in the same country 
and across different years bear absolutely no similarity (0%, Table 5-9), while banks 
belonging to the same financial group across different years resemble each other by 
18% (Table 5-7). Therefore it is crucial to address the parent - subsidiary relationship. 
It is also important to control for country specific time varying effects at the host 
country level.   
5.2.3. Financial group's country of origin as a determinant for credit growth 
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Table 5-10: Crossed Random Effects Models, with controls for the home country and the 
parent effect 
Dependent variable: Loan 
Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.121 0.303
**
 0.146 0.328
**
 
 (0.0965) (0.108) (0.0955) (0.107) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.299
***
 0.309
***
 0.311
***
 0.312
***
 
 (0.0440) (0.0457) (0.0436) (0.0452) 
Size, 1st lag -3.930
***
 -4.462
***
 -3.766
***
 -4.291
***
 
 (0.499) (0.574) (0.493) (0.558) 
Profitability, 1st lag 0.999
**
 1.128
***
 0.945
**
 1.054
**
 
 (0.334) (0.329) (0.332) (0.327) 
Deposit ratio, 1st lag  0.0157 0.0191 0.0186 0.0162 
 (0.0308) (0.0327) (0.0304) (0.0319) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag 0.0614 0.0230 0.0486 0.00942 
 (0.0337) (0.0334) (0.0332) (0.0328) 
GDP growth 1.391
***
 1.330
***
 1.402
***
 1.333
***
 
 (0.242) (0.239) (0.250) (0.243) 
Inflation rate 0.737
**
 0.675
**
 0.744
**
 0.686
**
 
 (0.251) (0.250) (0.249) (0.246) 
Interest rate -0.466
*
 -0.449
*
 -0.467
*
 -0.470
*
 
 (0.216) (0.215) (0.214) (0.211) 
Global financial crisis -4.663 -4.109 -4.441 -4.307 
 (9.482) (9.611) (9.461) (9.808) 
Constant 60.24
***
 66.18
***
 56.89
***
 63.94
***
 
 (8.984) (9.974) (8.892) (9.793) 
 Random Effects 
 Year effect 
sd(constant) 12.15
***
 12.33
***
 11.95
***
 12.51
***
 
 (2.422) (2.456) (2.444) (2.515) 
 Home Country effect 
sd(constant) 3.762
***
 8.71e-10
***
 3.553
**
 9.94e-08
**
 
 (1.272) (4.22e-09) (1.427) (0.000000515) 
 Home Country * year effect 
sd(constant)   6.640
***
  
   (1.168)  
      Parent effect 
sd(constant)  13.06
***
  12.86
***
 
  (2.027)  (2.083) 
 Parent * year effect 
sd(constant)    7.815
***
 
    (1.391) 
 Residual, Standard Deviation 
     
 24.71
***
 23.68
***
 24.01
***
 22.60
***
 
 (0.423) (0.423) (0.440) (0.500) 
N 1746 1746 1746 1746 
Log Likelihood -8110.2 -8089.3 -8100.6 -8081.9 
AIC 16248.4 16208.7 16231.1 16195.8 
BIC 16324.9 16290.6 16313.1 16283.2 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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In this paragraph it is investigated the effect of the home country on subsidiaries' 
credit growth. Equation (4.2) and Equation (4.3) are slightly amended, by introducing 
an extra level: home country. 
 
Parent banks have a single home country across their whole history in the sample 
therefore parents are treated as nested within their home countries. In the random 
component the study gradually introduces several effects (Table 5-10). Model (1) 
includes a crossed random effect of time and a crossed home country effect. Model 
(2) includes a crossed random effect of time, a crossed home country effect and a 
random effect of parent, which is nested within home country.  In models (3) and (4) 
the above estimations are repeated and also allow for an interaction between time and 
either home country or financial group. Results (Table 5-10) indicate that, once the 
parent effect is added, the variance at the home country level remains significant but it 
approaches zero.  Therefore, the home country effect can be ignored and  the analysis 
can focus on the level of parent banks. 
 
5.3. Parent bank fundamentals and credit growth 
 
Table 5-11 presents the baseline results for the determinants of foreign bank lending in 
CESEE countries during the years 2000-2014. Models include controls for parents' 
financial characteristics and macroeconomic conditions of the parents' home country.   
 
Lagged credit growth is found to have a persistent effect on today’s outcomes. 
However the global financial crisis of 2008 clearly brought about a large negative 
effect. Economic growth both at the host country and the home country level has a  
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Table 5-11: Determinants of subsidiaries credit extensions - including parent banks' 
characteristics 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Loan Growth  FE sys GMM diff GMM 
    
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.134*** 0.226*** 0.151*** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.232 0.094 0.398 
 (0.220) (0.252) (0.287) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.427*** 0.601*** 0.317*** 
 (0.094) (0.090) (0.089) 
Size, 1st lag -17.870*** -6.285*** -12.090*** 
 (1.647) (1.236) (2.619) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.158* 1.141 0.041 
 (0.598) (0.723) (0.704) 
Deposit ratio, 1st lag -0.053 -0.119 -0.234** 
 (0.054) (0.083) (0.111) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.151*** -0.041 -0.168*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.057) 
GDP growth 0.995*** 1.019*** 0.914*** 
 (0.203) (0.251) (0.237) 
Inflation rate 0.306 0.416 0.051 
 (0.314) (0.258) (0.358) 
Interest rate -0.736** -0.513** -0.257 
 (0.369) (0.259) (0.390) 
Parent: Profitability, 1st lag 1.131 1.263 2.540 
 (0.714) (0.855) (1.672) 
Parent: Liquidity, 1st lag -0.160 -0.164* 0.245 
 (0.104) (0.089) (0.203) 
Parent: Economic Capital, 
1st lag 
-1.028** -0.506 -3.859*** 
 (0.414) (0.475) (0.990) 
Parent: Loan Impairments , 
1st lag 
-2.421** -2.955*** -9.836*** 
 (1.032) (0.879) (2.329) 
Global financial crisis -0.599 -7.420*** -9.241*** 
 (2.336) (2.135) (2.477) 
Home country: GDP growth 0.790*** 0.699** 0.364 
 (0.269) (0.323) (0.369) 
Home country Inflation rate -0.613 -1.090** -0.639 
 (0.564) (0.454) (0.519) 
Constant 275.606*** 105.421***  
 (25.609) (21.105)  
    
Observations 1,568 1,568 1,355 
R-squared 0.496   
No of banks 193 193 181 
No of instruments  185 177 
AR-2  0.817 0.458 
Hansen J  0.230 0.261 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual 
bank fixed effects with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. 
diff GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors.'AR-2' is 
the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the 
p-value of the  Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the  null of 
instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit ratio 
is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed in %. 
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significant and positive effect.  Interest rates at the home country level are also 
significant with a negative sign thus reflecting a transmission channel of lending costs 
from the home to the host economy.  
 
Large subsidiaries exhibit lower credit growth rates on average. Subsidiaries' 
profitability has been found significant in only one out of the three estimation 
methods. Therefore subsidiaries do not fund their growth through their own profits. 
This indicates a longer-term expansion strategy of parents in the region, whereby 
current profitability at the domestic level is a secondary parameter. This is not a 
surprising result, as it has been documented in previous empirical literature, Cull and 
Martinez (2013) and Haas and Lelyveld (2006).  
 
Subsidiary's funding structure, namely deposit rate, is also found irrelevant for its 
credit growth, in line with Cull and Martinez (2013). Once it has been found 
significant with a negative sign, therefore the higher the deposit rate the slower the 
credit growth. Foreign subsidiaries did not rely heavily on local deposits as a source 
of funding for their credit expansion. Also subsidiaries expand credit irrespectively of 
their capital ratio. This result must be seen in comparison with parents' economic 
capital, which is significant and negative in two out of the three model estimations. 
Consequently, what constrains subsidiaries credit growth is parent capital position 
rather their own domestic capital position. This is an indication of a rather centralized 
management of capital levels within Groups. These findings contrast De Haas and 
Lelyveld (2006; 2010). They found capital ratios at subsidiary level significant but for 
a wider set of countries and they did not control for parent bank's capital rate. Yet, 
current findings are in line with Cull and Martinez (2013) which includes models 
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based on our geographical region of interest. Subsidiary's liquidity is consistently 
significant and positive. On the other hand, parent liquidity is found significant only 
once and with a negative sign. Therefore, on top of capital ratio, parent liquidity acts 
also as a constraint for subsidiary's credit growth. The direction of this effect is in line 
with parents offering support to their subsidiaries. It is an indication of parents issuing 
loans to their subsidiaries, in order to boost subsidiaries' liquidity, at the expense of 
their liquid assets position (e.g. cash and government securities).   
 
The results on liquidity constraints at the parent bank level are in line with De Haas 
and Van Lelyveld (2010). The latter study also finds subsidiary liquidity to be 
relevant.  When parents decide a conservative policy and resort to withholding more 
liquid assets, credit growth at the subsidiary level declines. When parents decide to 
reduce their own liquidity positions they pass-on more liquid assets to their 
subsidiaries (e.g. granting of intragroup loans). This in turns transforms into credit 
growth in the host country.  
 
Parents' asset quality is a relevant determinant of credit growth at subsidiary level. 
Specifically this variable is the rate of loan impairment charges to total loans. This is 
consistently significant across models. Loan impairment charges are also at subsidiary 
level significant. Loan impairments are the result of the project screening intelligence 
at consolidated level. The global financial crisis determined losses for banks and a 
deterioration of their loan portfolio. It could be argued that loan impairments are 
capturing the effect of time and of the crisis. To control for this, the model is re-
estimated model including year dummies (Table 5-12 columns 1, 2 and 4).  Moreover 
for robustness country dummies are also included (Table 5-12, columns 3 and 4). As a  
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Table 5-12: Determinants of subsidiaries credit extensions - including parent banks' 
fundamentals and controlling for year fixed effects and host country fixed effects  
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan Growth  sys GMM diff GMM sys GMM sys GMM 
     
Lagged loan growth, 1st lag 0.190*** 0.106*** 0.280*** 0.200*** 
 (0.053) (0.040) (0.050) (0.051) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.281 -0.031 -0.221 0.116 
 (0.333) (0.310) (0.291) (0.367) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.296** 0.442*** 0.520*** 0.288** 
 (0.124) (0.098) (0.125) (0.120) 
Size, 1st lag -5.929*** -24.221*** -10.046*** -6.388** 
 (2.248) (7.636) (1.806) (3.132) 
Profitability, 1st lag 0.105 -0.060 2.548** 0.052 
 (0.673) (0.429) (1.008) (0.675) 
Deposit ratio, 1st lag 0.032 -0.081 0.036 0.011 
 (0.086) (0.111) (0.096) (0.084) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.098* -0.148** -0.256** -0.098** 
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.114) (0.049) 
GDP growth 0.467 0.269 0.676*** 0.594** 
 (0.306) (0.337) (0.239) (0.273) 
Inflation rate 0.281 0.013 0.109 0.273 
 (0.268) (0.408) (0.299) (0.300) 
Interest rate -0.607** -0.322 -0.310 -0.318 
 (0.290) (0.384) (0.371) (0.365) 
Parent: Profitability 0.644 -0.571 0.542 0.241 
 (0.640) (1.892) (0.724) (0.566) 
Parent: Liquidity -0.089 -0.198 -0.205** -0.088 
 (0.090) (0.278) (0.090) (0.081) 
Parent: Economic Capital -0.000 -0.931 -0.314 0.159 
 (0.418) (1.051) (0.403) (0.402) 
Parent: Loan Impairments -1.859** -5.486** -2.289*** -1.553** 
 (0.778) (2.625) (0.856) (0.777) 
Global financial crisis   -7.344***  
   (2.359)  
Home country: GDP growth 0.625*** 0.758 0.761*** 0.650*** 
 (0.232) (0.731) (0.262) (0.223) 
Home country Inflation rate -1.123** -1.446** -1.128** -0.974** 
 (0.526) (0.725) (0.447) (0.488) 
Constant 77.660*  138.208*** 82.232 
 (40.696)  (29.382) (49.880) 
     
Host Country dummies NO NO YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES NO YES 
Observations 1,568 1,354 1,568 1,568 
No of banks 193 181 193 193 
No of instruments 119 105 187 136 
AR-2 0.229 0.938 0.918 0.231 
Hansen J 0.120 0.218 0.172 0.151 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  diff GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with 
robust standard errors. 'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the 
residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the p-value of the  Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically 
distributed as chi2 under the  null of instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment 
charges to gross loans. Deposit ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 
2008; All ratios are expressed in %. 
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result, parent health (asset quality) remains consistently significant across the several 
model specifications and the second most relevant determinant of credit growth. 
Therefore, the measure of loan impairments and their effect on credit growth captures 
intrinsic characteristics of parents such as their ability to manage their portfolios and 
choose to finance profitable projects. At the parent level, liquidity and capital cease to 
be significant. All other results stay the same with the exception of home country 
inflation rate, which is a significant negative determinant of credit growth at the 
subsidiary level. 
 
A second robustness check is run. The sample contains Greek banks with operations 
in the region. Those banks for some years operate with negative economic capital. At 
consolidated level they incurred huge losses derived primarily from their home 
country operations. This extreme case might be driving the results, especially those 
concerning parent health (asset quality). To account for this effect the models are re-
estimated excluding Greek banks for the years they operate with negative capital 
ratio. The results are reported in Table 5-13. Overall the results are the same as above, 
with parent health remaining an important determinant of credit growth at subsidiary 
level. An interesting exception is the profitability of the parents, which turns 
significant. On the other hand subsidiaries' profitability is only partially significant. 
Consequently, those parents not facing extreme adverse conditions sustain credit 
growth through their own profitability and transfer of resources to the subsidiaries.  
 
The third set of robustness checks tests the effect generated by the inclusion of 
relatively large subsidiaries into the sample, whereby the subsidiary size is defined in 
relation to parent bank balance sheet. Following previous literature (De Haas and Van 
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Lelyveld, 2010; Jeon et al., 2013) endogeneity issues have been precluded because the 
average subsidiary balance sheet is significantly smaller than its parent bank balance 
sheet in the database. If a subsidiary is small relative to the parent bank, the omitted  
Table 5-13: Subsidiaries’ credit growth - including parent banks' fundamentals, home 
country macro and excluding subsidiaries with parent banks operating with negative capital 
ratio 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Loan Growth FE sys GMM diff GMM sys GMM sys GMM 
      
Loan growth 0.133*** 0.223*** 0.145*** 0.219*** 0.288*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.043) (0.047) 
Economic Capital 0.226 0.008 0.344 0.202 -0.322 
 (0.220) (0.244) (0.309) (0.232) (0.268) 
Liquidity 0.421*** 0.569*** 0.269*** 0.494*** 0.508*** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.091) (0.121) (0.126) 
Size -17.716*** -6.341*** -11.461*** -2.822** -9.396*** 
 (1.637) (1.247) (2.794) (1.133) (1.638) 
Profitability 1.047* 0.916 -0.025 0.063 1.960** 
 (0.595) (0.701) (0.602) (0.622) (0.993) 
Deposit ratio -0.056 -0.140* -0.239** 0.010 0.024 
 (0.054) (0.079) (0.108) (0.078) (0.093) 
Loan Impairments -0.157*** -0.051 -0.159*** -0.042 -0.260** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.057) (0.047) (0.108) 
GDP growth 0.905*** 0.989*** 0.898*** 0.740** 0.623*** 
 (0.205) (0.254) (0.247) (0.290) (0.229) 
Inflation rate 0.314 0.372 0.199 0.324 0.151 
 (0.311) (0.258) (0.372) (0.252) (0.287) 
Interest rate -0.740** -0.423 -0.457 -0.334 -0.292 
 (0.371) (0.258) (0.470) (0.256) (0.367) 
Parent: Profitability 3.680*** 3.450*** 8.405*** 1.052 2.444** 
 (1.042) (1.059) (2.146) (0.856) (0.999) 
Parent: Liquidity -0.121 -0.152* 0.455** -0.072 -0.173** 
 (0.108) (0.090) (0.215) (0.079) (0.084) 
Parent: Economic Capital -1.186*** -0.627 -4.535*** 0.002 -0.388 
 (0.421) (0.424) (1.154) (0.372) (0.419) 
Parent: Loan Impairments -1.988* -2.974*** -7.323*** -1.901** -2.031** 
 (1.054) (0.991) (2.471) (0.915) (0.854) 
Global financial crisis -1.414 -8.454*** -11.591***  -8.370*** 
 (2.386) (2.048) (2.852)  (2.418) 
Home country: GDP growth 0.740*** 0.543* -0.068 0.454* 0.647** 
 (0.283) (0.314) (0.411) (0.257) (0.292) 
Home country Inflation rate -0.696 -1.202*** -1.093** -0.742 -1.187*** 
 (0.492) (0.392) (0.439) (0.535) (0.414) 
Constant 273.186*** 109.731***  51.588** 139.424*** 
 (25.684) (21.456)  (20.345) (25.947) 
      
Host Country dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
Year Dummies NO NO NO YES NO 
      
      
Observations 1,540 1,540 1,328 1,540 1,540 
R-squared 0.495     
No of banks 193 193 181 193 193 
No of instruments  185 177 189 187 
AR-2  0.763 0.696 0.176 0.869 
Hansen J  0.245 0.196 0.323 0.189 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual 
bank fixed effects with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  
diff GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-2' is the 
p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the p-
value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of instrument 
validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit ratio is the 
ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; all ratios are expressed in %. 
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variable bias is considered to have an immaterial effect on the results. In the study at 
hand the average subsidiary accounts for about 2.3 per cent of its parent bank’s assets, 
well below the average detected in other previous studies
18
. However, some 
subsidiaries in the sample have a balance sheet size higher than 10% of the total 
balance sheet of the parent bank. These represent roughly 4% of the total observations 
in the dataset. 
To test for a potential bias introduced by these relatively large subsidiary banks, all 
subsidiaries with a balance sheet above 10% of the parent’s bank balance sheet have 
been excluded from the sample. Table 5-14 reports the results. A full reading of the 
estimation results suggests that the estimation methods and sample are robust, thus 
confirming by and large the findings. 
  
                                                          
18De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) have considered an average size of 10% for a subsidiary as being 
small enough 
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Table 5-14: Subsidiaries’ credit growth controlling for parent banks' fundamentals and 
excluding subsidiaries with assets exceeding 10% of financial group's total assets 
 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) 
Loan Growth  FE sys GMM diff GMM sys GMM sys GMM 
      
Loan growth (t-1) 0.134*** 0.218*** 0.140*** 0.169*** 0.219*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.050) (0.045) 
Economic Capital (t-1) 0.283 -0.025 0.423 0.372 0.147 
 (0.222) (0.211) (0.270) (0.320) (0.328) 
Liquidity (t-1) 0.411*** 0.546*** 0.318*** 0.280** 0.512*** 
 (0.101) (0.091) (0.091) (0.127) (0.124) 
Size (t-1) -17.648*** -7.337*** -12.416*** -6.681*** -8.213*** 
 (1.730) (1.236) (2.873) (2.389) (1.668) 
Profitability (t-1) 1.047* 0.855 0.089 -0.116 0.869 
 (0.600) (0.727) (0.627) (0.605) (0.652) 
Deposit ratio (t-1) -0.046 -0.050 -0.190* 0.064 0.004 
 (0.056) (0.083) (0.104) (0.084) (0.073) 
Loan Impairments (t-1) -0.149*** -0.064 -0.155*** -0.101* -0.097* 
 (0.053) (0.048) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) 
GDP growth 1.075*** 1.072*** 1.051*** 0.474 1.224*** 
 (0.196) (0.234) (0.210) (0.290) (0.265) 
Inflation rate 0.331 0.394 0.147 0.315 0.202 
 (0.326) (0.267) (0.374) (0.297) (0.305) 
Interest rate -0.737* -0.476* -0.446 -0.686** -0.233 
 (0.378) (0.264) (0.445) (0.295) (0.411) 
Parent: Profitability (t-1) 0.778 0.853 1.418 0.422 0.272 
 (0.717) (0.802) (1.526) (0.690) (0.719) 
Parent: Liquidity (t-1) -0.132 -0.104 0.237 -0.069 -0.155* 
 (0.107) (0.090) (0.215) (0.095) (0.086) 
Parent: Economic Capital  -1.148*** -0.390 -3.489*** 0.136 -0.222 
(t-1) (0.410) (0.451) (0.912) (0.418) (0.418) 
Parent: Loan Impairments  -2.903*** -3.078*** -9.764*** -2.148** -3.145*** 
(t-1) (1.114) (0.926) (2.607) (0.828) (0.849) 
Global financial crisis -0.794 -6.478*** -7.647***  -4.263* 
 (2.444) (1.994) (2.596)  (2.472) 
Home country: GDP growth 0.899*** 0.827*** 0.621 0.615** 0.903*** 
 (0.302) (0.309) (0.380) (0.245) (0.273) 
Home country: Inflation rate -1.063** -1.467*** -1.155** -1.507*** -1.380*** 
 (0.502) (0.423) (0.467) (0.492) (0.412) 
Constant 272.596*** 117.558***   119.359*** 
 (26.599) (21.975)   (25.245) 
      
Host country dummies NO NO NO NO YES 
Year dummies NO NO NO YES NO 
      
Observations 1,494 1,494 1,294 1.494 1,494 
R-squared 0.503     
No of banks 191 191 179 191 191 
No of instruments  185 177 119 182 
AR-2  0.799 0.414 0.305 0.756 
Hansen J  0.283 0.337 0.222 0.213 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual 
bank fixed effects with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  
diff GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-2' is 
the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the 
p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of 
instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit 
ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed 
in %. 
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5.4. The effect of ownership before and after the crisis 
 
 
Next, it is investigated if and how the impact of foreign ownership changes after the 
global financial crisis. Equation (4.1) is estimated for the periods 2000-2007 and 
2008-2013 controlling for membership in a financial group and time effects. Results 
are reported in Table 5-15 (columns 1 to 6).  
 
Before the global financial crisis, subsidiaries consistently expanded credit more than 
domestic banks. This is the same result for the overall sample. The situation changes 
after the global financial crisis. On average subsidiaries cease to exhibit any 
significant difference in their propensity to extent credit compared to domestically 
owned banks.  
 
The same effect is captured through an alternative modeling approach. Equation (4.1) 
is estimated across all the years and a new set of variables is added, which is 
generated by the interaction between a crisis dummy and an ownership variable 
identifying membership of a bank in an international financial group. The crisis 
dummy equals 1 for the years 2008-2013 and 0 for all the other years. As a result, 
there are obtained four categories namely: subsidiary banks before the crisis, domestic 
banks before the crisis, subsidiary banks after the crisis and domestic banks after the 
crisis. In columns 7-9 of  Table 5-15
19
 the estimated coefficients should be interpreted 
as a deviation from the baseline of being a domestic bank before the crisis.  
 
Before the crisis subsidiaries boosted local credit growth more than domestic owned 
banks. However, both groups of banks contributed to a contraction of credit after the 
                                                          
19 The full set of results is reported in the Appendix, Table D-1. 
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crisis. This confirms the previous findings. In addition, the negative reaction of 
domestic banks was more pronounced than subsidiaries on average. Therefore, there 
is still detected some sort of divergence in the behavior between domestically owned 
and foreign owned banks, whereby foreign owned banks (on average) contracted 
credit less than domestic banks after controlling for macroeconomic and bank balance 
sheet characteristics.  
Table 5-15: Loan growth of members of foreign financial groups vis-à-vis domestic banks 
before and after crisis 
Dependent Variable – Loan Growth of subsidiary i 
 Before the 2008 crisis 
(2000-2007) 
After the 2008 crisis 
(2008-2013) 
Pooled with pre-post crisis dummies 
interacted with ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
FE 
sys  
GMM 
diff  
GMM  
 
FE 
sys  
GMM 
diff 
GMM 
 
FE 
sys  
GMM 
diff  
GMM 
          
Subsidiary 
bank (owned 
by a financial 
group) 
24.278*** 8.493*** 11.824*** -0.219 2.374 -2.299    
 (7.349) (2.548) (4.435) (9.083) (1.691) (20.254)    
          
 
Before the 
crisis: 
subsidiary 
bank 
      
 
23.905*** 
(4.886) 
 
9.223*** 
(2.553) 
 
15.880*** 
(5.550) 
 
After the crisis: 
domestic bank 
       
-7.205*** 
(2.467) 
 
-17.154*** 
(2.632) 
 
-19.933*** 
(4.473) 
 
After the crisis: 
subsidiary 
bank 
      
 
8.433* 
(5.081) 
 
-14.901*** 
(3.065) 
 
-12.196*  
(7.052) 
          
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,122 1,391 1,391 1,145 2,551 2,551 2,267 
R-squared 0.301   0.302   0.468   
Banks 258 258 245 253 253 237 293 293 275 
Instruments  146 112  186 136  279 244 
AR-3  0.979 0.904  0.607 0.508  0.709 0.816 
Hansen J  0.409 0.377  0.188 0.248  0.443 0.318 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; year dummies included in estimations from (1) to (6); models from (7) to 
(9) include a crisis dummy taking value 1 for years 2008-2013. This dummy is interacted with the financial group dummy variable to generate the 
sub-period effects. FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual bank fixed effects with robust standard errors. The whole set of 
regressors is omitted as the interest is focused on the pre-post crisis effects. Sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
estimator.  Difference GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-3' is 
the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 3. 'Hansen J' is p-value of the Hansen 
J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of instrument validity. In models (2),  (3),  (5) and 
(6) bank characteristics are instrumented with their third to fifth lag and  forward orthogonal deviations are applied to the instruments for the 
transformed equation; in model (8)  bank characteristics are intrumented with their third to fifth lag and  both forward and backward orthogonal 
deviations are applied. Finally, in model (9),  bank characteristics are instrumented with their third to sixth lag and  both forward and backward 
orthogonal deviations are applied. 
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5.5. Direct effects of excessive credit growth on future credit extensions 
 
Previous empirical studies found a relationship between excessive credit expansion 
and problem loans. Jiménez & Saurina (2006) model problem loan ratios as a function 
of macro- and micro-variables (loan portfolio characteristics).  Their sample consists 
of loans to non-financial firms granted by Spanish banks over the period 1984-2002. 
They find a robust statistical relationship between rapid credit growth and ex post 
credit risk measures, suggesting that risks materialize after four years as a 
consequence of rapid credit growth. 
 
So far, in all estimation results, loan impairment charges at parent level are a 
significant determinant of subsidiary's credit growth. Higher loan impairment charges 
consistently deteriorate credit growth at subsidiary level. Loan impairments reflect 
poor selection of project financing, for instance. If a bank engages into an aggressive 
expansionary policy, then it might follow more lenient screening standards. If that is 
the case, then the probability of having financed bad projects increases along with 
higher loan impairments the years that follow. This determines a decline of credit 
growth. This channel is investigated, analyzing the effect of past excessive loan 
growth on current loan growth.  
 
Equation (4.7) is re-estimated adding a variable capturing excessive credit expansion 
at parent and subsidiary level. This variable is a dummy that equals one if a bank 
expanded credit more than the yearly average of its peer group, which is set a 
benchmark. At the parent level, the peer group consists of all international banks that 
operate in the region in a certain year.  
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Table 5-16: The effects of excessive credit growth at parent and subsidiary level 
 Parent Level Subsidiary Level 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan Growth  FE sys GMM diff GMM FE sys GMM diff GMM 
       
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.133*** 0.226*** 0.148*** 0.105*** 0.287*** 0.180*** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) 
Economic Capital, 1st  0.203 0.029 0.308 -0.092 -0.188 -0.313 
lag (0.229) (0.259) (0.285) (0.191) (0.198) (0.438) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.438*** 0.599*** 0.339*** 0.462*** 0.442*** 0.422*** 
 (0.098) (0.093) (0.090) (0.085) (0.091) (0.136) 
Size, 1st lag -18.30*** -6.397*** -13.061*** -21.691*** -3.917*** -20.187*** 
 (1.636) (1.226) (2.970) (2.758) (1.276) (2.611) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.196** 1.153 0.062 1.662*** 1.605** 1.717** 
 (0.604) (0.731) (0.631) (0.524) (0.727) (0.849) 
Deposit ratio, 1st lag -0.059 -0.109 -0.247** 0.019 -0.116* -0.333*** 
 (0.055) (0.082) (0.111) (0.061) (0.062) (0.100) 
Loan Impairments, 1st  -0.149*** -0.037 -0.170*** -0.144*** -0.055 -0.119 
lag (0.050) (0.053) (0.056) (0.052) (0.095) (0.131) 
GDP growth 0.983*** 1.004*** 0.921*** 0.832*** 1.185*** 0.829*** 
 (0.201) (0.249) (0.243) (0.156) (0.249) (0.201) 
Inflation rate 0.293 0.458* 0.019 0.587*** 0.520** 0.400* 
 (0.315) (0.261) (0.366) (0.220) (0.210) (0.230) 
Interest rate -0.701* -0.471* -0.197 -0.717** -0.567** -0.711** 
 (0.371) (0.265) (0.438) (0.342) (0.249) (0.352) 
Parent: Profitability,  1.235 1.383 2.850*    
1st lag (0.749) (0.914) (1.634)    
Parent: Liquidity, 1st  -0.165 -0.161* 0.184    
lag (0.102) (0.089) (0.203)    
Parent: Economic  -1.014** -0.552 -4.039***    
Capital, 1st lag (0.420) (0.481) (0.970)    
Parent: Loan  -2.426** -2.794*** -9.513***    
Impairments, 1st lag (1.026) (0.905) (2.389)    
Parent: Excessive  0.271 -0.207 -1.066    
growth, 1 year before (1.456) (1.469) (1.648)    
Parent: Excessive  -2.738* -1.314 -2.948*    
growth,  2 years before (1.526) (1.511) (1.756)    
Parent: Excessive  -1.017 -1.240 -1.609    
growth, 3 years before (1.316) (1.403) (1.358)    
Parent: Excessive  0.694 -0.969 -0.926    
growth, 4 years before (1.281) (1.208) (1.206)    
Global financial crisis -0.674 -7.281*** -8.705*** -0.585 -7.229*** -3.303* 
 (2.257) (2.117) (2.801) (1.786) (1.846) (1.881) 
Home country: GDP  0.764*** 0.735** 0.363    
growth (0.269) (0.314) (0.366)    
Home country Inflation  -0.586 -1.026** -0.532    
rate (0.570) (0.463) (0.528)    
Member of a foreign    19.918*** 4.288** 18.301*** 
financial group    (3.713) (1.817) (3.898) 
Excessive growth,     2.446* -0.760 -0.010 
1 year before    (1.436) (1.538) (1.634) 
Excessive growth,     1.563 1.304 0.638 
2 years before    (1.067) (1.204) (1.100) 
Excessive growth,     -0.055 -0.549 -0.691 
3 years before    (0.961) (1.076) (1.153) 
Excessive growth,     -1.446 0.583 -1.232 
4 years before    (1.034) (1.191) (1.134) 
Constant 283.244*** 108.017***  293.944*** 59.717***  
 (25.359) (20.995)  (42.148) (22.402)  
       
Observations 1,568 1,568 1,355 2,143 2,143 1,863 
R-squared 0.498   0.438   
No of banks 193 193 181 280 280 264 
No of instruments  189 181  255 219 
AR-2  0.819 0.402  0.487 0.120 
Hansen J  0.225 0.284  0.109 0.218 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual bank fixed effects 
with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  diff GMM refers to estimation 
using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test. 'Hansen J' 
is the p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. 
Deposit ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed in %. 
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At the subsidiary level, each subsidiary’s credit growth is compared with the annual 
average of all banks operating in the same host country in a given year. This variable 
is computed accounting for up to four lags following previous literature (Jiménez & 
Saurina, 2006). 
 
Results are reported in Table 5-16. Estimations at parent and subsidiary level fail to 
indicate any connection between past excessive credit growth and current credit 
growth. This may imply that banks in the region of focus do not necessarily 
undermine their pre-screening policies when they extend credit aggressively or that 
excessive credit per se is not an indicator of exuberance in banks’ risk taking attitude. 
 
 
5.6. Risky attitude and credit growth 
 
Fabrizio et al (2006) observed that weak banks were expanding credit with the same 
pace as sound banks, examining credit growth in the region during the years 2001-
2004. The authors point out that prudential risk materializes at later stages and warns 
of the possible effects of too much risk taking. Theory also predicts that less solvent 
banks tend to respond to moral hazard incentives by undertaking more portfolio risk, 
gambling for a jump in future earnings (Marcus, 1984). The sample allows the  
investigation of the effects of such behavior linking past excessive risk taking to 
subsequent credit growth.  
 
To do so, a new dummy variable is constructed that combines two elements, namely: 
excessive credit growth and negatively misaligned capital ratio. The dummy variable 
equals one if a bank expanded credit more than the annual average of its peer group  
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Table 5-17: Excessive risk taking a parent and subsidiary level 
 Parent Level Subsidiary Level 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan Growth  FE sys GMM diff GMM FE sys GMM diff GMM 
       
Loan growth, 1st lag 0.133*** 0.220*** 0.145*** 0.118*** 0.284*** 0.422*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.030) (0.034) (0.061) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.230 0.106 0.348 -0.072 -0.573*** 0.010 
 (0.222) (0.243) (0.275) (0.193) (0.208) (0.487) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.427*** 0.582*** 0.330*** 0.448*** 0.488*** 0.708*** 
 (0.094) (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.090) (0.142) 
Size, 1st lag -17.419*** -5.971*** -12.167*** -21.155*** -4.999*** -26.720*** 
 (1.704) (1.112) (2.843) (2.759) (1.222) (3.313) 
Profitability, 1st lag 1.183* 1.136 0.090 1.660*** 1.577** 2.166** 
 (0.605) (0.721) (0.664) (0.528) (0.703) (1.027) 
Deposit ratio, 1st lag -0.057 -0.131 -0.247** 0.019 -0.056 -0.227* 
 (0.055) (0.085) (0.113) (0.061) (0.066) (0.127) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.152*** -0.044 -0.165*** -0.147*** -0.098 -0.469** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.060) (0.053) (0.098) (0.229) 
GDP growth 1.015*** 1.063*** 0.948*** 0.821*** 1.017*** -0.478* 
 (0.202) (0.250) (0.245) (0.155) (0.227) (0.269) 
Inflation rate 0.336 0.450* 0.120 0.576*** 0.626*** -0.043 
 (0.313) (0.267) (0.363) (0.220) (0.210) (0.254) 
Interest rate -0.726** -0.460* -0.272 -0.725** -0.576** -1.388*** 
 (0.368) (0.259) (0.442) (0.345) (0.253) (0.463) 
Parent: Profitability, 1st lag 1.036 1.119 2.471    
 (0.734) (0.827) (1.649)    
Parent: Liquidity, 1st lag -0.161 -0.153* 0.191    
 (0.104) (0.087) (0.203)    
Parent: Economic Capital, 1st  -1.010** -0.620 -3.691***    
lag (0.416) (0.419) (0.967)    
Parent: Loan Impairments, 1st  -2.432** -2.829*** -9.026***    
lag (1.046) (0.884) (2.324)    
Global financial crisis -0.930 -7.686*** -8.623*** -0.965 -7.674*** -10.815*** 
 (2.300) (2.106) (2.832) (1.752) (1.693) (2.397) 
Home country: GDP growth 0.748*** 0.645** 0.353    
 (0.263) (0.299) (0.377)    
Home country Inflation rate -0.562 -0.986** -0.622    
 (0.590) (0.432) (0.516)    
Parent: Risky 1.655 2.369 0.059    
 (1.647) (1.551) (1.665)    
Parent: Risky, 2nd lag -1.105 -2.088 -1.516    
 (1.596) (1.494) (1.607)    
Parent: Risky, 3rd lag -2.680** -4.207*** -3.174**    
 (1.352) (1.424) (1.514)    
Parent: Risky, 4th lag -0.338 -2.266* -1.080    
 (1.270) (1.335) (1.373)    
Member of foreign financial    19.975*** 5.427*** 22.918*** 
group    (3.794) (1.882) (4.948) 
Risky    1.329 -1.753 -13.651*** 
    (1.442) (1.532) (2.276) 
Risky, 2nd lag    1.963* 2.186 -3.494** 
    (1.168) (1.381) (1.702) 
Risky, 3rd lag    -0.378 -0.690 -3.456*** 
    (1.128) (1.327) (1.324) 
Risky, 4th lag    -1.164 -2.329* 0.849 
    (1.188) (1.365) (2.615) 
Constant 269.643*** 103.163***  286.768*** 74.767***  
 (26.215) (19.285)  (42.424) (22.100)  
Observations 1,568 1,568 1,355 2,143 2,143 1,861 
R-squared 0.498   0.437   
No of banks 193 193 181 280 280 264 
No of instruments  189 181  259 191 
AR-2  0.902 0.467  0.434 0.604 
Hansen J  0.272 0.279  0.148 0.212 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual bank fixed effects 
with robust standard errors.  sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  diff GMM refers to estimation 
using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is 
that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 'Hansen J' is the p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is 
asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of instrument validity. Economic Capital is the ratio of equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio 
of liquid assets to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans. 
Deposit ratio is the ratio of customer deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008; All ratios are expressed in %. 
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and at the same time the bank had a capital ratio less the annual average of its peer 
group, where the peers are defined as in section 5.4.1. This variable is constructed 
both at parent and at subsidiary level.  
 
Results are reported in Table 5-17. Subsidiary level estimates do not produce 
consistent results across the three models. On the other hand, at the parent level 
results are more interesting and consistent across the deployed models. Excessive 
credit expansion combined with a deterioration of the capital ratio always predicts a 
decline of credit growth in the following periods, after three years specifically. Taking 
these findings together with the previous results gives us a more complete perspective 
on the role of parent capital. In all sections above, parents’ capital ratio, whenever 
significant, was found negative. This indicates that subsidiaries owned by better 
capitalized parents extend less credit on average. Such a narrative however has its 
limitations. These results help to sharpen the previous findings. Excessive credit 
growth associated with an excessive decrease in the capital ratio at parent level 
reduces subsidiaries’ capacity to extend credit.  
 
 
5.7. Credit growth of foreign banks and the Business cycle 
 
In most of the case above economic growth has a positive effect on credit growth. 
This result remains unaltered either economic growth concerns the host country or the 
home country of the parent.  
 
Findings concerning the host country are expected, since they are in line with 
previous empirical literature (Allen et al, 2015; Jeon et al, 2013). Foreign banks play 
consistently a pro-cyclical role in the host economies.  
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However, it is surprising the result concerning home country's growth rate. Growth in 
the home country benefits credit extensions in the host country. Therefore, parent 
banks do not view their foreign operations as a substitute to those in their home 
countries. This contrasts De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014; 2010), which finds that 
home country's economic growth has a negative impact on subsidiaries' credit growth. 
According to this study, parent banks trade off lending opportunities between their 
own country and the countries of operation.  
 
In this strand of literature, none so far has identified the relationship between business 
cycle and credit growth with the use of direct measures of the business cycle. Instead, 
they are using measures of macroeconomic variables, with the most prominent one 
GDP growth. The present study moves a step further, as it captures the business cycle. 
Following Athanasoglou et al (2008), the business cycle is captured with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, that calculates deviations of  real GDP
20
 from the trend.  
 
Supposing that foreign banks behave procyclically, when the output gap is positive 
(GDP exceeds its trend) credit growth should rise too. In a similar manner, when GDP 
is below trend, credit growth is expected to slow down. The study accounts for 
asymmetric effects of the business cycle, by splitting the cycle variable into two 
separate ones. The first one captures positive output gaps. It takes the positive values 
and if not positive then it equals zero. Similarly it is built a second variable of 
negative output gap, which equals zero whenever the gap is positive. Estimations are 
run controlling either for the home country's business cycle or the host country's.  
                                                          
20
 Specifically the HP filter is applied on the natural logarithm of the real GDP 
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Table 5-18: Sensitivity to the Business Cycle 
 
 Sensitivity to the Cycle of the  
host country 
Sensitivity to the Cycle of the 
home country  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE sys GMM diff GMM FE sys GMM diff GMM 
       
Credit growth, 1st lag 0.093** 0.205*** 0.102** 0.093** 0.204*** 0.120*** 
 (0.043) (0.046) (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) 
Economic Capital, 1st lag 0.351* 0.291 0.407* 0.347 0.291 0.182 
 (0.200) (0.243) (0.228) (0.215) (0.254) (0.279) 
Liquidity, 1st lag 0.439*** 0.611*** 0.322*** 0.440*** 0.617*** 0.463*** 
 (0.091) (0.087) (0.088) (0.093) (0.089) (0.124) 
Size, 1st lag -20.641*** -7.060*** -17.816*** -21.709*** -7.593*** -21.252*** 
 (1.682) (1.240) (2.870) (1.643) (1.345) (2.520) 
Profitability, 1st lag 0.912* 0.689 -0.214 0.971* 0.986 0.106 
 (0.529) (0.650) (0.543) (0.515) (0.677) (0.587) 
Deposit rate, 1st lag -0.016 -0.039 -0.165* -0.023 -0.055 -0.222** 
 (0.053) (0.078) (0.087) (0.055) (0.086) (0.092) 
Loan Impairments, 1st lag -0.160*** -0.036 -0.178*** -0.171*** -0.054 -0.222*** 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.055) (0.051) (0.048) (0.058) 
Inflation rate -0.446 -0.015 -0.407 -0.438 0.003 -0.341 
 (0.321) (0.248) (0.341) (0.308) (0.252) (0.320) 
Interest rate -0.391 -0.442* -0.191 -0.434 -0.471* -0.446 
 (0.318) (0.241) (0.380) (0.321) (0.259) (0.355) 
GDP growth    -0.187 0.361 -0.066 
    (0.265) (0.263) (0.282) 
Parent: Profitability, 1st lag 0.730 1.030 0.723 0.813 1.123 0.948 
 (0.659) (0.793) (1.363) (0.638) (0.807) (0.647) 
Parent: Liquidity, 1st lag -0.102 -0.117 0.204 -0.100 -0.116 -0.074 
 (0.100) (0.092) (0.196) (0.094) (0.102) (0.102) 
Parent: Economic Capital,  -0.661* -0.452 -2.141** -0.821** -0.636 -0.997** 
1st lag (0.393) (0.428) (0.823) (0.410) (0.457) (0.420) 
Parent: Loan Impairments,  -1.921** -3.063*** -7.354*** -1.627** -2.806*** -1.729** 
1st lag (0.827) (0.893) (2.152) (0.681) (0.800) (0.753) 
Global financial crisis -12.308*** -18.086*** -17.080*** -11.049*** -14.702*** -11.593*** 
 (1.946) (2.121) (2.631) (2.240) (2.075) (2.366) 
Home country: GDP growth 0.055 0.302 -0.169    
 (0.278) (0.315) (0.350)    
Home country Inflation rate -1.191** -1.629*** -1.331*** -1.264** -1.668*** -1.355*** 
 (0.461) (0.389) (0.461) (0.489) (0.429) (0.494) 
Host country: cyclical  26.503 118.288*** 48.918    
output below trend (31.538) (28.997) (37.604)    
Host country: cyclical  218.816*** 132.010*** 197.376***    
output above trend (27.847) (23.051) (28.953)    
Home country: cyclical     42.281 66.494* 39.160 
output below trend    (32.924) (34.601) (37.204) 
Home country: cyclical    212.538*** 124.718*** 198.245*** 
output above trend    (26.254) (21.345) (25.027) 
Constant 310.284*** 114.057***  328.780*** 121.756***  
 (25.958) (21.410)  (25.507) (23.265)  
       
Observations 1,569 1,569 1,355 1,570 1,570 1,382 
R-squared 0.541   0.539   
No of banks 193 193 181 193 193 182 
No of instruments  186 178  186 178 
AR-2  0.953 0.414  0.836 0.559 
Hansen J  0.318 0.273  0.282 0.229 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual 
bank fixed effects with robust standard errors.  Sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
estimator.  Difference GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard 
errors. 'AR-2' is the p-value of the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 2. 
'Hansen J' is the p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the 
null of instrument validity.Economic Capital is Equity to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Loan Impairments is the ratio of Loan Impairment charges to gross loans. Deposit rate is the 
ratio of Customer Deposits to total funding. Global financial crisis is a dummy for year 2008. 
All ratios are expressed in %. 
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Results are reported in Table 5-18.  Concerning host country's business cycle, foreign 
banks systematically accelerate economic growth since they respond to positive 
phases of the cycle. In one out of the three estimation models, but the preferred one, 
banks seem to respond to negative phases of the cycle too.  Foreign banks retreat from 
the host countries when there is a decline in economic activity there, but at a slight 
more cautious pace than during upturns. When growth is present, their impulse to 
increase operations in the host countries is much stronger than their impulse to 
withdraw from them during economic downturns. 
 
Positive phases of the cycle in the home countries always bear positive spillovers for 
the host countries. Banks do not view their operations in the region as a substitute of 
one another. They do not increase their investment in their flourishing home economy 
at the expense of their foreign operations. On the contrary, when their home economy 
grows, they place more resources in their operations in CEESE.    
 
On the other hand, when home country's output is below its trend, its influence on 
subsidiary's credit extensions, if significant,  is of the half magnitude compared to 
periods of growth. Foreign bank operations are somewhat insulated from downswings 
in the home economies, although they can be affected. 
 
 Chapter 6  
Conclusions 
 
Current research investigates the determinants of credit growth in CESEE accounting 
for the large presence of foreign banks. Overall, the presence of foreign banks in the 
CESEE region is judged as beneficial. Parent banks originated from flourishing 
economies benefit the host countries, through further extensions of credit by their 
subsidiaries.  Indeed, they have contributed to a contraction of credit after the global 
financial crisis. Yet, their reaction was less pronounced compared with the contraction 
exercised by  domestic banks. 
 
However, subsidiaries credit behavior cannot be viewed in isolation. To the contrary, 
it needs to be framed into the operating landscape which includes the linkages to 
foreign entities and their economies. This is the most important contribution of this 
research to the literature. 
 
In order to investigate the behavior of foreign subsidiaries, dynamic credit growth 
models were used, controlling also for parent's fundamentals.  Lagged credit growth is 
found to have a persistent effect on today’s outcomes. However the global financial 
crisis of 2008 clearly brought about a large negative effect. Economic growth both at 
the host country and the home country level has a significant and positive effect.  
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Interest rates at the host country level exert a negative impact on credit growth as 
expected. This suggests that borrowers are more reluctant to demand more debt when 
interest rates move up. In addition also interest rates at home country level are also 
significant with a negative sign thus reflecting a transmission channel of lending costs 
from the home to the host economy. Subsidiaries’ size has a negative impact 
suggesting that large subsidiaries expand their loan portfolio at a slower pace. Higher 
subsidiaries’ liquidity levels have a positive effect on credit growth as expected. 
Subsidiaries' profitability has been found significant only rarely. Therefore, 
subsidiaries do not fund their growth through their own profits. This indicates a 
longer-term expansion strategy of parents in the region, whereby current profitability 
at the domestic level is a secondary parameter. This is not a surprising result, as it has 
been documented in previous empirical literature, Cull & Martinez (2013) and Haas 
and Lelyveld (2006). Subsidiary's funding structure, namely deposit rate, is also found 
irrelevant for its credit growth, in line with Cull and Martinez (2013). Also 
subsidiaries expand credit irrespectively of their capital ratio. Last but not least, 
parents' asset quality (loan impairment charges) is a relevant determinant of credit 
growth at subsidiary level. Loan impairment charges are also at subsidiary level 
significant. Loan impairments are the result of the project screening intelligence at 
consolidated level. The global financial crisis determined losses for banks and a 
deterioration of their loan portfolio. The measure of loan impairments and their effect 
on credit growth capture intrinsic characteristics of parents such as their ability to 
manage their portfolios and choose to finance profitable projects. Finally, a peer 
group analysis unveils that risky behaviors at the parent bank level jeopardize future 
credit extensions at the subsidiary level. Specifically excessive credit expansion and 
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reduction of economic capital ratios lead to a decline in subsidiaries' lending capacity 
in three years’ time.  
 
The findings of this study have strategic and policy implications. First, it exhibits that 
the ownership structure cannot be ignored, given the systemic role of foreign banks in 
the CESEE region. Second, the performance of subsidiaries is heavily dependent on 
the composition and quality of the parent banks’ balance sheet. Therefore, a 
consolidated approach should be considered when looking at lending conditions in 
any of the countries of the CESEE region. Third, negative and positive cross border 
externalities are fundamental drivers of credit at domestic and regional level. This 
implies that large players and home country regulators should internalize the direct 
implications of their strategic decisions on host countries banking sectors and for 
healthy credit expansions. On the other hand, host country regulators need to consider 
the natural and intrinsic relevance of elements beyond their control when taking 
decisions, including parent banks’ balance sheet health as well as home countries 
cyclical position. Therefore, a continuous and open cross border collaboration and 
coordination between home and host regulators is fundamental for the stability of the 
regional banking sectors.  
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Appendices 
 
A. Details on the construction of the sample 
A.1. Ownership  
The study is grounded in a unique dataset of ownership data of the banks in our 
region. The exact process followed was: 
 
Initially the number of banks in the dataset had to be determined. A list of all 
commercial, cooperatives and savings banks operating in the region was downloaded 
from Bankscope along with their basic financials of any account available in the 
database. This way there were duplicate values for each bank. Next the duplicates 
were dropped iteratively for a given bank favoring consolidated accounts (Duprey and 
Le, 2014). This is how someone can get the longest time series possible with each 
bank appearing only once in our sample. Banks with less than 3 consecutive years in 
the sample were eliminated. Then market shares were calculated, defining 
geographically the market at the level of each country. Banks with less than 1% of 
Market share were eliminated.  
 
This resulted in a catalogue to banks per country covered by Bankscope.  The next 
step was searching for their ownership over each year for which there are financial 
data in Bankscope.  For this purpose a wide variety of sources were researched, 
namely Bankscope, Amadeus, financial statements,  S&P  IQ capital, Bloomberg, 
Central bank reports, Ministries’ reports,   stock exchanges and news. In each case the 
reliability of the source available was assessed and would determine the number of 
additional sources one had to look for in order to cross check the data (i.e. audited 
financial statements would alwayes be considered as superior to data from 
commercial databases).  
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A.2. Imputations 
 
When constructing the database of characteristics of banks, the aim was to obtain the 
longest and most uniform possible time series. Bankscope includes data sourced from 
financial statements based on consolidated and unconsolidated accounting standards. 
Each accounting standard includes several sub-categories. Bank balance sheet 
characteristics can be available in one or multiple standards. Moreover the length of 
the time series varies depending on the accounting standards.   
 
Duprey and Lé (2014) suggest an iterative procedure when dealing with Bankscope 
data. First the level of consolidation should be chosen. Preference was given to 
consolidated accounts (e.g. C). Second the available companion data should be 
employed (C*), otherwise an alternative standard of data should be considered to 
cover for missing data. The growth rate of the companion consolidated accounts (C*) 
was calculated and it was applied to the time series imputing forward and backward 
the missing values. If this procedure was still leaving some missing values, we 
checked for the availability of an alternative time series - based on unconsolidated 
accounts (U) in our case. Ultimately if data gaps were still emerging, those were filled 
applying the growth rates of companion unconsolidated statements
21
 (U*). This 
procedure removed
22
 the shift effects between one year and another due to the 
                                                          
21
 After this last step in the data cleaning processes few breaks were still detected for 19 banks or 31 
observations out of 3700. The missing observations were reconstructed applying a compound growth 
rate to the available data - Compound annual growth rate =
Ending Value
Beginning Value
1
# of years − 1  
22
 However the employment of unconsolidated data growth rates to extend consolidated data relies on 
the assumption that a bank maintains the same level of operations over time. A bank may sell part of its 
operations. Therefore it has no obligation to keep consolidated accounts because the aggregate level of 
its operations has changed. To avoid this issue it is preferred to apply backdating growth rates based on 
consolidated accounts to extend unconsolidated data series. Whenever this has led to do more 
imputations than the number of observations available, were employed growth rates of unconsolidated 
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employment of different accounting rules, which a  data replacement  approach would 
have generated. 
 
A.3. Duplication Issues 
 
The merger deals of all banks in the sample were checked very carefully. If banks 
would get absorbed at some point during the period covered, then the exact time that 
legally the deal came into power was identified. If for any reason the absorbed party 
would maintain operations as a separate entity for a year after the deal, we would 
either a) eliminate it or b) use unconsolidated accounts for both entities in the sample.  
 
In many cases banks demonstrated very complicated ownership structures with 
several intermediate owners. If those owners are included in the sample as individual 
banks also duplication issues arise, especially whence consolidated accounts are used.  
For example UniCredit Bank dd in Bosnia Herzegovina has as intermediate owner the 
Croatian Zagreback Banka which belongs to UniCredit SpA. If one would include 
consolidated accounts both for the Bosnian and the Croatian Bank, then the Bosnian 
bank is double counted.  
 
After finalizing the ownership database and having collected all bank identifiers, the 
merger history of each bank was checked again. Amadeus database was used and 
checked all merger deals that our banks were involved in, to ascertain no intermediate 
owner was overlooked.  If those intermediate owners concerned the database as 
individual banks too, then we took extra care of them following the data imputation 
process.      
When doing the imputations we kept track for those intermediate owners what sort of 
accounts were used as base for the calculations. If consolidated data where used, then 
we subtracted from those the data of the smallest subsidiary.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
accounts to extend the time series of consolidated accounts. All in all the latter form of imputation 
concerns only 48 observations out of 3700. 
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A.4. Breaks in the Time Series 
For 19 banks there were breaks in the time series. The years missing were 
reconstructed using the compound growth rate
23
. In total 31 observations were 
reconstructed. 
For a single bank 5 consecutive years were reconstructed, in two cases 3 years were 
reconstructed, in four cases 2 consecutive years and for the  majority of cases (11)  we 
reconstructed only one year. 
                                    
Figure A-1: Breaks in the time series and number of observations that were reconstructed 
 
 
   A.5. Outliers 
After compiling the database and filling all missing values, several banks were 
exhibiting large growth rates of assets. We defined extreme growth rate an expansion 
or shrinking of assets larger than 20%. Out of 3700 observations 1611 are identified 
as extreme and the problem concerns almost all banks in our database. Out of the 323 
banks 310 exhibit an extreme growth of assets at least once over the whole time 
period.  
The first check was examining if this could be attributed to the imputation process 
used. 80 banks have both imputed values and extreme growth of assets. We examined 
the cases one by one. We see that the extreme growth of assets doesn’t concern the 
                                                          
23
  
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
1
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
− 1 
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time period for which data have been imputed and the problem spans over several 
other years.  
Next we checked if the there was a general market trend of extreme growth in each 
country and our outliers are only riding the tide. 749 cases follow the general market 
trend.  
Then we checked again for mergers or any other change of ownership. In 83 cases a 
bank of our sample acquired another bank and its growth rate is much above the 
market average. In 41 cases the major shareholder of a bank was altered which 
brought about a corporate restructuring and none of all the above scenarios apply. It is 
assumed that a corporate restructuring lasts at least three years, one year before the 
merger and a year after the event. In other 20 cases the major shareholder increased or 
decreased its percentage of shares which resulted to a bank changing also its status 
from domestic to foreign or vice versa.  
 
Summing up 718 cases remain unexplained. The question that follows is whether 
those extreme values are attributed to measurement errors of the Bankscope and 
should be trimmed or depict actualized large deviations in the market. Bankscope 
provides assurances of data accuracy and having triple checked the data before their 
appearance on line (Andrianova, et al., 2015)
24
. Therefore we choose not to trim those 
data.  
Observations were trimmed if  
1. capital ratio is below 0 or over 100% or 
2. liquidity ratio is below 0 or over 100% or 
3. loan impairments to total loans is below -100% or over 100% or 
4. deposit ratio is below 0 or over 100% or 
5. returns on assets are less than -40% or 
6. credit growth is below -100% 
  
                                                          
 
24
 Banks use some kind of automatic procedure  and  update directly to Fitch, who checks the entries. 
Bankscope receives the data from Fitch and checks again. Finally  Bankscope checks the data a third 
time right before uploading them (Andrianova et al, 2015).  
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B. The Sample. Distribution of banks & Aggregate Market shares 
 
Table B-1: Distribution of banks by Country, Year and type of ownership 
Number  
of banks  
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
                            
Albania 
Domestic 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 
Foreign 2 2 3 4 6 6 8 8 8 9 9 8 8 9 
Armenia 
Domestic 
  
1 2 1 6 5 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 
Foreign 5 6 12 15 14 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Bosnia Herzegovina 
Domestic 9 9 10 8 8 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 8 7 
Foreign 5 6 12 15 14 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Bulgaria 
Domestic 8 9 8 7 8 8 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 
Foreign 14 14 15 16 15 15 15 11 11 11 11 10 10 9 
Czech Republic 
Domestic 4 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign 17 17 18 18 18 17 18 17 16 16 15 16 16 16 
Estonia 
Domestic 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Foreign 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Croatia 
Domestic 6 5 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Foreign 13 14 12 11 9 9 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 8 
Hungary 
Domestic 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Foreign 14 14 14 15 14 14 14 11 11 9 9 9 9 9 
Kosovo 
Domestic 
 
1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign 
  
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Lithuania 
Domestic 6 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 
Foreign 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Latvia 
Domestic 11 12 12 13 13 14 11 9 8 7 7 7 8 7 
Foreign 6 7 7 7 7 6 8 10 10 10 11 10 9 10 
Montenegro 
Domestic 1 1 3 4 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Foreign 
 
1 1 1 2 3 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 
FYROM 
Domestic 6 8 8 8 7 6 8 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Foreign 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 8 9 8 7 8 8 8 
 
(The table continues on the next page) 
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(Table B-1 continued from previous page) 
 
Poland 
Domestic 6 6 6 6 6 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 5 
Foreign 11 13 13 14 15 17 17 17 19 19 19 19 19 17 
Romania 
Domestic 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
Foreign 13 13 13 14 14 15 14 14 14 13 14 14 13 13 
Serbia 
Domestic 13 18 22 21 21 15 12 10 11 11 11 9 7 6 
Foreign 
 
3 4 9 10 14 17 17 16 16 16 17 17 17 
Slovenia 
Domestic 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Foreign 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 
Slovak Republic 
Domestic 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Foreign 9 11 12 12 12 14 12 12 12 11 11 11 10 9 
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Figure B-1: Aggregate market shares of foreign banks by country and year 
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Figure B-2: Market share weighted aggregate credit growth of foreign banks vs domestic 
banks by country and year 
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 Table B-2: Financial groups with subsidiaries operating in CESEE in 2000-2014 
Financial Group 
Home 
Country Host Country 
Volksbanken Holding regGenmbH AT BA, CZ, HR, HU, RO, RS, SI 
Raiffeisen AT AL, BA, BG, CZ, HR, HU, KV, PL, 
RO, RS, SI, SK 
BAWAG P.S.K. AG AT CZ, SI, SK 
Steiermarkische Bank und Sparkassen AG-Bank Styria AT BA, MK 
Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG AT BA, CZ, HR, HU, RO 
Heta Asset Resolution AG - Former Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank 
International AG 
AT BA, HR, ME, RS, SI 
Erste Group Bank AG AT CZ, HR, HU, RO, RS, SK 
Creditanstalt AG AT SI 
BNP Paribas Fortis SA/ NV BE RO 
KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC Group BE CZ, HU, PL, RS, SK 
Dexia SA BE SK 
Central Cooperative Bank AD BG MK 
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd CY RS 
Bayerische Landesbank DE CZ, HR, HU 
Commerzbank AG DE HU, PL 
Deutsche Bank AG DE CZ, PL 
Dresdner Bank AG DE CZ 
LHB Aktiengesellschaft DE BA, RS 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale NORD/LB DE LT, LV, PL  
Portigon AG DE HU 
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG-LBB Holding AG DE CZ 
DZ Bank AG-Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank DE HU 
ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA DE AM 
UniCredit Bank AG (Proforma)- former Bayerische Hypo-und 
Vereinsbank AG 
DE BA, BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL, RO, RS, 
SI, SK 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg DE CZ 
Danske Bank A/S DK EE, LT, LV 
Banco Santander SA ES PL 
Sampo Plc FI EE, LT, LV 
SociÈtÈ GÈnÈrale SA FR AL, BG, CZ, HR, ME, MK, PL, RO, 
RS, SI, SK 
BNP Paribas SA FR BG, HU, KV, PL 
CrÈdit Agricole S.A. FR AL, CZ, HU, PL, RS, SK 
Le CrÈdit Lyonnais (LCL) SA FR HU, SK 
HSBC Holdings Plc GB AM 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) GB RO 
National Bank of Greece SA GR AL, BG, MK, RO, RS 
Emporiki Bank of Greece SA GR AL 
Alpha Bank AE GR AL, BG, MK, RO, RS  
Eurobank Ergasias SA GR BG, RO, RS 
Piraeus Bank SA GR AL, BG, RO, RS  
Zagrebacka Banka dd HR BA 
MKB Bank Zrt HU BG 
OTP Bank Plc HU BG, HR, ME, RO, RS, SK 
Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA-Banca CR Firenze SpA IT RO 
Banca Commerciale Italiana SpA, COMIT IT HR, HU 
(The table continues on the next page) 
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(Table B-2 continued from previous page) 
Financial Group 
Home 
Country Host Country 
UniCredit SpA IT BA, BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL, RO, RS, 
SI, SK 
SANPAOLO IMI IT HU, RO  
Intesa Sanpaolo IT AL, BA, HR, HU, RO, RS, SK 
Veneto Banca scpa IT AL 
CreditBank SAL LB AM 
Byblos Bank S.A.L. LB AM  
AB Bankas Snoras LT LV 
AS Reverta LV LT 
AS Citadele Banka LV LT 
Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) N.V-DHB Bank TR MK 
Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A-Rabobank 
Nederland 
NL PL 
ING Bank NV NL BGPL 
Credit Europe Bank N.V. NL RO 
PPF Group N.V. NL CZ 
DnB ASA NO EE, LT, LV, PL 
Banco Comercial PortuguÍs, SA-Millennium bcp PT PL 
Komercijalna Banka A.D. Beograd RS BA, ME 
VTB Bank, an Open Joint-Stock Company (JSC) RU AM  
Sberbank of Russia OAO RU BA, CZ, HR, HU, RS, SI 
MDM Bank RU LV 
Gazprombank Open Joint-Stock Company RU AM 
Joint Stock Commercial Bank - Bank of Moscow RU EE, LV 
SMP Bank, Limited Liability Company-Commercial bank Severniy 
morskoy puts 
RU LV 
Swedbank AB SE EE, LT, LV  
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE EE, LT, LV 
Nordea Bank AB (publ) SE PL  
NLB dd-Nova Ljubljanska Banka d.d. SI BA, KV, ME, MK, RS 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. SI RS 
Fiba Holding AS TR RO 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi  A.S. TR BA, MK 
Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. TR MK 
Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. TR RO 
Finansbank A.S. TR RO 
Birlesik fon Bankasi AS TR AL 
Kentbank A.S. TR AL 
Public Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank "PrivatBank" UA LV 
Pivdennyi Joint-Stock Bank UA LV 
Ukrprombank LLC-Ukrainsky Promyslovy Bank LLC UA AM 
General Electric Capital Corporation-GE Capital US CZ, HU, PL 
Citigroup Inc US CZ, HU, PL, RO, SK 
 
Notes: The codes denote countries as below: AL = Albania, AM = Armenia, AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, BA = 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, BG = Bulgaria,  CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, CY = Cyprus, 
EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB = UK, GE = Georgia, GR = Greece, HR = Croatia, HU 
= Hungary, IT = Italy, KV = Kosovo, LB = Lebanon,  LT = Lithuania,  LV = Latvia, ME = Montenegro, MK = 
FYROM,  NL = Netherland, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal,  RO = Romania, RS = Serbia, RU = 
Russia, SE = Sweden,  SK = Slovakia, SI = Slovenia, TR = Turkey, UA = Ukraine, US = United States 
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C. Variable Descriptions & Sources, Correlation Tables and Structure of 
our Ownership data 
 
 
Table C-1: Description and sources of the variables 
Variables 
Indicator Measure Unite Source 
Credit Growth 
The first difference of the 
natural logarithm of loans 
multiplied by 100 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Economic Capital, both at 
subsidiary & parent level Equity to total assets 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Liquidity, both at subsidiary 
& parent level Liquid assets to total assets 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Size 
The natural logarithm of total 
assets 
Logarithm, initial 
values in th USD Bankscope 
Profitability, both at 
subsidiary & parent level Return to total assets 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Deposit ratio 
Customer deposits to total 
funding 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Loan Impairments, both at 
subsidiary & parent level 
Loan impairment charges to 
total loans 
%, Initial values in 
th USD Bankscope 
Real GDP Growth, both in 
the host and home country 
Host country's growth rate of 
real GDP  %  National Sources, IMF and IHS 
Inflation, both in the host 
and home country 
Host country's Consumer price 
index, year on year change % IHS 
Interest rate 
Host country's interest rate. For 
all countries long term interest 
rates were employed with the 
exception of Armenia. In this 
case the central bank policy rate 
was used. % National Sources, IMF and IHS 
Global Financial Crisis Equals 1 for the year 2008 Dummy   
Largest shareholder foreign 
1 if the largest shareholder is of 
foreign origin no matter the 
percentage it holds Dummy 
In-house constructed ownership 
database 
Foreign bank 
1 if the largest shareholder is 
foreign and holds over 49.9% of 
shares Dummy 
In-house constructed ownership 
database 
Member of a foreign 
financial group 
1 if the major shareholder is a 
financial group holding over 
49.9 % of shares Dummy 
In-house constructed ownership 
database 
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Table C-2: Correlations of the variables calculated for the whole sample 
 
 
  
Table C-3: Correlations of the variables calculated only for the sub-sample of subsidiaries of foreign financial groups 
 
 
 
Figure C-1: Structure of the data 
 
  
Subsidiary A Subsidiary B Subsidiary C 
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Parent 1         X X X   X X 
Parent 2 X X           X     
Parent 3     X X             
    
 
 
 D. Report of unabbreviated tables 
Table D-1: Loan growth of members of foreign financial groups vis-à-vis domestic banks before and after crisis 
 Before the 2008 crisis (2000-2007) After the 2008 crisis (2008-2013) Pooled with pre-post crisis dummies interacted with 
ownership 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Loan growth FE sys GMM diff GMM fe sys GMM diff GMM FE sys GMM diff GMM 
          
Loan growth (t-1) 0.080** 0.330*** 0.277*** 0.066* 0.244*** 0.079** 0.119*** 0.254*** 0.142*** 
 (0.039) (0.059) (0.085) (0.038) (0.056) (0.031) (0.024) (0.038) (0.048) 
Economic Capital (t-1) 0.275 0.135 0.179 0.257 0.137 0.325 0.358** 0.020 0.681 
 (0.334) (0.273) (0.334) (0.278) (0.253) (0.498) (0.159) (0.205) (0.434) 
Liquidity (t-1) 0.928*** 0.223** 0.326** 0.421*** 0.244** 0.427*** 0.417*** 0.114 0.464*** 
 (0.119) (0.112) (0.135) (0.074) (0.100) (0.134) (0.054) (0.086) (0.170) 
Size (t-1) -25.932*** -2.644 -9.600 -21.538*** -2.130** -19.332** -12.913*** -3.733*** -3.449 
 (3.809) (1.713) (6.792) (3.858) (0.901) (9.398) (1.622) (0.968) (3.643) 
Profitability (t-1) 0.891* 0.519 -0.207 0.913* 0.917 0.176 1.023*** 1.306* 0.546 
 (0.537) (0.644) (0.907) (0.521) (0.665) (0.840) (0.367) (0.682) (0.990) 
Deposit rate (t-1) -0.034 -0.065 -0.021 -0.024 0.111* -0.056 -0.053 0.020 -0.021 
 (0.107) (0.095) (0.136) (0.068) (0.060) (0.163) (0.067) (0.057) (0.134) 
Loan Impairments (t-1) -0.036 -0.060 -0.073 0.024 -0.069 -0.154 -0.136*** -0.262** -0.736*** 
 (0.079) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.112) (0.161) (0.042) (0.116) (0.223) 
GDP growth 1.718*** 1.105** 1.455*** 0.774*** 0.676*** 0.757*** 0.639*** 0.560*** 0.528*** 
 (0.616) (0.491) (0.475) (0.271) (0.221) (0.273) (0.147) (0.155) (0.179) 
Inflation rate -0.117 0.383 0.080 0.827*** 0.420 0.605** 0.608*** 0.419** 0.529** 
 (0.460) (0.294) (0.344) (0.277) (0.283) (0.277) (0.203) (0.201) (0.248) 
Interest rate -1.192*** -0.450 -0.208 0.166 -0.462* 0.183 -1.086*** -0.427** -0.515* 
 (0.439) (0.331) (0.399) (0.377) (0.255) (0.409) (0.256) (0.199) (0.291) 
member of a foreign financial group 24.278*** 8.493*** 11.824*** -0.219 2.374 -2.299    
 (7.349) (2.548) (4.435) (9.083) (1.691) (20.254)    
year==2003 3.982 17.231*** 5.464       
 (2.762) (3.569) (8.186)       
year==2004 9.093** 11.735*** 3.171       
 (3.876) (3.273) (6.653)       
year==2005 0.396 -3.682 -11.543**       
 (5.203) (2.985) (4.931)       
year==2006 28.170*** 26.497*** 19.783***       
 (5.630) (3.007) (5.202)       
year==2007 43.203*** 24.610*** 21.646***       
 (6.671) (3.393) (3.594)       
The table continues on the next page 
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Table D-1 continued from previous page 
year==2002  24.481*** 7.399       
  (3.199) (10.560)       
year==2009    6.491* 7.322** 4.525    
    (3.677) (3.590) (3.870)    
          
year==2010    -0.211 1.597 -1.739    
    (2.880) (3.255) (3.959)    
year==2011    -1.670 1.186 -2.688    
    (2.894) (3.392) (4.088)    
year==2012    7.554** 8.649** 5.621    
    (3.267) (3.356) (4.118)    
year==2013    7.438** 5.136 6.194    
    (3.667) (3.299) (4.943)    
year==2014    -3.377 -7.695* -5.888    
    (4.815) (4.243) (6.449)    
0b.fingroup#0b.crisis       0.000   
       (0.000)   
0b.fingroup#1.crisis       -7.205*** -17.154*** -19.933*** 
       (2.467) (2.632) (4.473) 
1.fingroup#0b.crisis       23.905*** 9.223*** 15.880*** 
       (4.886) (2.553) (5.550) 
1.fingroup#1.crisis       8.433* -14.901*** -12.196* 
       (5.081) (3.065) (7.052) 
Constant 314.897*** 30.109  294.008*** 12.492  178.565*** 66.686***  
 (50.074) (28.725)  (58.502) (16.663)  (24.607) (15.575)  
          
Observations 1,160 1,160 1,122 1,391 1,391 1,145 2,551 2,551 2,267 
R-squared 0.301   0.302   0.468   
No of banks 258 258 245 253 253 237 293 293 275 
No of instruments  146 112  186 136  279 244 
AR-3  0.979 0.904  0.607 0.508  0.709 0.816 
Hansen J  0.409 0.377  0.188 0.248  0.443 0.318 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; year dummies included in estimations from (1) to (6); models from (7) to (9) include a crisis dummy taking value 1 for years 2008-2013. This dummy is interacted with the 
financial group dummy variable to generate the sub-period effects. FE refers to panel estimation controlling for individual bank fixed effects with robust standard errors. The whole set of regressors is omitted as the interest is focused on the pre-post 
crisis effects. Sys GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator.  Difference GMM refers to estimation using the Arellano - Bond   difference panel data estimator with robust standard errors. 'AR-3' is the p-value of 
the Arellano - Bond test.  The H0 is that the average autocovariance in the residuals is of order 3. 'Hansen J' is p-value of the Hansen J test for overidentifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as chi2 under the null of instrument 
validity. In models (2),  (3),  (5) and (6) bank characteristics are instrumented with their third to fifth lag and  forward orthogonal deviations are applied to the instruments for the transformed equation; in model (8)  bank characteristics are 
intrumented with their third to fifth lag and  both forward and backward orthogonal deviations are applied. Finally, in model (9),  bank characteristics are instrumented with their third to sixth lag and  both forward and backward orthogonal 
deviations are applied. 
